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SHERE AL1 XHAN, THE AMEER. 

C A B U L  
on 
A F G H A N I S T A N  
BEINQ 
A PAMPHLET OF FACTS ABOUT THE COUNTRY 
THE AMEER AND THE PEOPLE 
WITI- I  A M A P  O F  TI-IE C O U N T R Y  
(SHOWING ROUTES OF ADVANCE AND PASSlS) 
PROM THE CASPIbN BEA TO THE IBDUS 
AND PROM THE ILUBBIAN LINES BEYOND THE OXUB 
TO TI I IQ  PERSIdN GULP. 
PI-IIL R O B I N S O N  
%tltriYott : 
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEAIZLE, & IiIVINGTON, 
CROWN DUILDINGIB, 188, PLZET BTRXET, I 
1678. 
[All vighla ~eservcd. ]  1 
NOTE. 
IN prefacing a compilation of this kind, it is hardly A P ~  doc 
necessary to say that the compiler has gladly utilized 
in his work all the material he could find to his 
b hand that was at once autlzoritative and well written T~ 
i 
-whether in the columns of the Press or in books. M' 
P The oilly authors qnoted are acknovlcdged masters of 
of the subject-Rawlinson, Valnbery, Bellem, Elphin- L4f, 
stone, Ferrier, and Sch~~yler. The nlap lllny be safely an 
accepted as correct, nlld nll clistances accurately cal- be 
culated from the scale given. I t  combines the latest st 
clata of the Indian Frontier Survey publications aail tb 
of the most recent mails of Central Asia. rn 
P. R'. er 
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C A B U L ; '  
011, 
A F G H A N I S T A N .  
~ilzd, it is harclly APART from its present political aspect the king- doll1 of the b e e r  of Cabul, Sheye Ali Khan, is 
'' g'aclly lyotiliZed f~dl  of interest for the stucleut as the theatre of 
to  'Iis Arab conquest and Islamite growth, the scam of 
Tartsr invaaion and havoc, a Terg hotbed of 
ess Or in ~00ks. Mohammedan bigotry and fanaticism, tllc ityeun 
fledgecl mastars of Shis and Souni hostility, the battle-field of 
BclIew, Elpliiu- Bfghans and Persians, the scene of British conquests I 
I p nlny be safely and disasters ; and as if nature had designed it to I 
accurately cal-  be the object of the world's attention, Afghanistaa H 
lines tllo latest stands uplifted from the great plains of Inclin and 
lblications the Khanates upon the shoulders of the great 
!is. mountain ranges that bound it on the north-east and 
P. 33. east. The mountains of the Hindu KCsh Cower up 
on its eastern frontier as a landlvnrlr to all Bsin, 
and point out to every invader tlie nrny to India. 
From the great range irregular spws diverge in 
every direction, and cover Afgllanistm with a net- 
.Pronounced as " ICarrbnl" (not ICnbool), nlld AfgLh1-Y-st2io. 
B 
work of mountain chains. Between them lie valleys 
of suipvsing fertility, ancl watered by pereni~ial 
streams. Here every cncmy of Inclia has rccruitecl 
his forccs, ancl more than once the hardy moun- 
taineers have themsclves poured through the passes 
of thc Snleimiin range that separates Afghanistan 
from India, to ravage the territories of the infidels of 
Hindustan. Known to the world generally by the 
name of Afghallistan, or country of the Afghans, it 
I is not so designated by the Afghans themselves, al- 
thongh the name is not nnknown to them. By the 
" Afghans their country is nsnally called c c  Wilayat " 
(hence the term " Wilayati," often applied to its 
peo~le by the natives of Hindustan) or native 
country. It is also distinguished by two appella- 
tions, inclncljng different portions of territory, vie. : 
( (  IIab~d," or ( (  Kiibnlist%n,'' which includes all that 
mountainons clistrict nol-th of Gliuzni ancl the 8afed2 
Icoh, as far as the Hindti Kdsh, limited towards the 
vest by the Huzarah country (the ancient Paropa- 
misns), ancl eastward by the Abba-Sin, or ( '  Father of 
R i ~ e r s , ' ~  the Inclns ; ancl c (  ICllorZs~an," or r c  Xzbu- 
listiin," which includes all that extensive track of 
country, Alpinc in its Eastern limits, ancl table-land 
or desert in its vestern extent, which stretches 
~ ~ r o u o u n c e c l  as Sufaid. 
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I THE MOUNTAINS. 3 
so~~thmarcl and weatmard from about tho latitude of 
Ghuzni, and borders on the confines of Persia, from 1 which, towarcls the south, it is separated by the 
i desert of SeistAn. A glance at the map will acquaint 
I the reader with the bo~mdaries of the kingdom. 
The main features of Afghanistan, vllich measures 
about 430 miles from east to west, ancl 460 miles from 
south to north, are t'he mountain chains, the general 
direction of wl~ich is east and vest, bnt which throw 
out buttresses to  the north ancl south. Afgliailistan 
is traversed across tho centre, from east to vest, by 
the HinclB-Ichsh, or more properly the Hinail- 
Koh, encling in the Koh-i-Baba, a huge mass 
north-west of and at  no great distance from the 
city of Cabnl. It is covered vith perpetual snow, 
ancl its loftiest peak is nearly 18,000 feet high. 
Thence run two parallel chains, one called the 
Safecl Koh, or white monlltain ;" the other-the 
so~~themmost one-the Siah Koh, or ( (  black moun- 
tain." These mountains are of no great height. 
North of the ICoh-i-Baba and the Safed Koh is a 
high plateau, intersected by minor ranges, and 
3 called the Hnzara district. Running in a south- 
{ 
west direction fronl Cabnl, paat Canclahar to 
Giriahk, is another chain of mo~~ntains. 
The Safecl Koh deserves a separate reference; 
B 2 
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for, should the project of invasion, as announced, be 
executed, and a force enter Afghanistan by may of 
Thal and the Riirnm river, the Safed 1<oh will do 
duty as an effectual barrier against any attempt I 
from the north to disturb the advancing column, for 
it covers the line of advance up to the turning point 
of the l<i~mm river, whence, by the reg~~llar road, 6 
both Gllnzni ancl the t o m  of Cabnl may be corn- 
mmded. The high ground about Glluzai forms the 
vater-shed for the drainage of both divisions of 
Afghallistan. All to the north of this site flows 
northwarcl to the Cabnl river, and ultimately reaches 
the stream of the Indus. But a11 to the south of it 
flows sonthward ancl westward, and is either lost in 
the sancls that prevail in tllcsc directions, or else, 
joining the rivers Tarnak and Argnnclub, ultimately 
reaches the lake of Seisthn. Two streams only flow 
south-castward toward the Indns. Of these the 
Gomal is lost in the soil, soon after leaving the hills 
it drains, and the KErnm reaches ihe Iudns near 
Isa-1<11ail. 
Towards the west, watering the table-land of 
Candal~ar and Herat, are the several rivers flowing 
into the lake of Seistbn. Of these the Halllland is the 
largest, and before reaching the lake it rcceives the 
united streams of the Tarnal. a id  Argandab, and, 
0 
farther on, the KhZsh-rGd. During the summer 1 t 
TIIF RIVERS. 
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months all these streams, with the exception, pcr- 
hapi, of the river Halrnand, become almost com- 
pletely dry. In Cabul the rivers are more numer- 
ous for the extent of surface than in Khorassan, 
and are of greater vol~me, though of less extent. 
The principal are the streams of Logar, Khasgar, 
and Swat, which, joining the Gabul river in dif- 
ferent parts of its course, add their waters to those 
of the Indus at Attock. Of these the Logar and the 
I(as11gar streams (the latter with its tributaries 
draining the hills of Enfiristan) are fordable at most 
seasons throughout their course. BLI~ the Swat and 
Cabul rivers are ollly fordable with ease during the 
earlier part of their course. 
Though seen now in the lowest depth of its 
poverty, Clle kingdom of the Ameer has a past 
history of some grandeur, and the vast arcllitec- 
tural remains that heap many of its valleys and 
strew its plains bear witness to a prosperous age 14 
t(l1at has gone. Thus, from Ghuzni westward, 
all along the valleys of the Tarnak and the Hal- 
rn~~nd,  down to the basin of Seistan, the whole 
country is covered with the ruins of former I 
towns, obliterated canals, and deserted cultivation, i 
the sad memories of the Tartar devastations under 
Gilengiz Khan and Tiinour in the thirteellth and 
I 
fifteenth centuries. I t  is, however, tlie last word of i 1 
those who have studied its resources that Afghanis- 
tan requires only a settled governlnent to regain all its 
past power and wealth. Its mineral resources are 
great; gold, silver, iron, and lead are among the 
indigenous metals, and salt, saltpetre, snlphur, ancl 
antimony abound. In vegetable products it is aoto- 
rionsly rich, for here the flora of the East ancl West 
meet as on neutral ground. Besides all the Indim 
cereals slnd the lx~nclred varieties of the melon ancl 
cucumber kinds known to Asia, the castor-oil, 
I 
tobacco, cotton, madder, and other valuable 
econoinic plants of the East, there are found the 
i f r ~ ~ i t s  and flowers of Europe also. The olive, mnl- 
berry, oak, cedar, walnut, ancl pine flourish, with all 
our orchard trees and garden shmbs. English vege- 
tables are in every bazaar, ancl in tlie country side the 
rose, jessamine, and hyacinth grow wild. A com- 
plete catalogue would almost exhaust botany; but 
sufficient varieties have alreacly been cited to denote 
tlie vast range of the vegetable world of Cabnl. 
From Chis nlay be inferred corresponding variety of 
climate. Though lying between the 29th and 35th 
degrees of latitude, Afghanistan, taken as a whole, 
escapes, by its elevation, the heat that shonlcl 
characterize it. The telnperatnre is f~~r the r  modified 
locally by the presence on the one side of the snow- 
i. THE CLINATE. 7 
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clad Hindu Ki~sh, and on the other of barren sancl 
tracts. The periodical winds sveeping over the one 
bring a sharp, bracing air; over the other collie the 
dry, parching blasts so well known in the East. 
Thus, the plain of Jelliilabacl during summer is 
intolerably hot; while to the south the Safed Roh 
lifts LIP its snowy peals, ancl to the west lies the 
table lancl of Cabul, enjoying the coolness and ver- 
dure of a temperate climate. At Candshar the 
temperature in summer is excessive. At Cabul it- 
self the winter is more severe than in England, while 
in summer the heat is greater. The inhabitants, 
therefore, wear s t  one tinle clothes of felt, with 
cloaks of sheepskin, sleeping at night under rugs 
before a fire ; ancl at another thin chintz or mnslin 
robes, ancl have their beds out uncler the trees. 
The climate is, however, colder than that of Afghan- 
istan generally, bat is very regnlar. There are three 
inontlis of the winter, three of spring, three of snm- 
mer, and tliree of autumn. During the winter, 
which sets in about the beginning of December, the 
t o m  is regularly blockaded by the snow, which com- 
pletely blocks up the streets, so that business is at 
a standstill. 
Of the industrial products of Afghanistan little c m  
be said, for the Afghans are not a manufacturing 
8 CBBUL. 
people. The few mannfactnres they have merely 
suffice for their ordinary vants. 
The aiiirnals of Afghanistan are the horse, camel, 
and shecg. The first are largely exportecl. into 
India, ancl. lor the most part come from the countries 
on the west of Afghanistan. Of late years, however, 
large numbers have been bred in Afghanistan, ex- 
pressly for the Indian market, ancl. the breed is 
becoming greatly improved o-cving to the care and 
jndicions breeding. 
As n race, there are few to compare in physique 
and energy of character -with the Afghans proper- 
for the country is peopled by an infinite divorsity of 
races. The Tajik, of Persian origin, and the 
Hnzara, the residue of Tartar invasion, Usbegs and 
Turkomans of varions tribes, I~nzzilbash Moguls, 
ancl. a bewildering variety of Hindi and Kashmiri 
colonists, all combine to form the population, mhile 
southward, but still subjects of the Ameer of Cabul, 
are the Brahoes and Relnchis, descended from dif- 
ferent stocks, and speaking different languages, and 
n medley of emigrant communities froin Hindustan 
and Persia. 
I t  should be remembered that Afghanistan never 
has had, and never can have the cohesion ancl. 
consistency of a regular monarchical government. 
THE AFGHANS NOT A NATION. F) 
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The nation consists of a mere collection of tribes, 
held together more or less closely, accorcling to the 
character of their chief. The feeling of patriotism 
cannot exist, for there is no common country. 
Indeed, there is no etlmical reason why Hernt and 
Candahar should be at1;achecl to Cabul. 
The hill tribas of Huzara, for instance are not at 
all or little uncler the control of the Cabul Govern- 
ment, md though they achowleclge the ruling king 
there as heacl of their nation, they would, in case of 
invasion or attack from without, rush as reaclily 
to the standard of theis own chiefs iu Ghe hope of 
local pluncler as io the standard of the king for tho 
protection of their country. In times of peace they 
withdraw to their own higl~land homes and inde- 
pendence. The total population has never been 
accurately calculated, and while some authorities 
fix it much lower, others estimabe it  at about 
nine millions. A great variety of races contri- 
bute to the total, but the most numerous and most 
important in every way are the Afghans proper. 
They number nearly four millions. Their lan- 
guage proves, on analysis, one of tlze most in- 
teresting known to plzilologists, for its roots strike 
equally into Hebrew, Sanscrit, Asiatic, and Persian, 
with a large adivixture of words clerivecl fyom no 
10 CABUL. 
known source. I t  is called Pushtn, and is almost 
entirely a spoken language, tlle character being 
Arabic, with only very slight modifications to express 
particular sounds which in the spoken language have 
no corresponding s o ~ u d  in any other Oriental tongue. 
From the presence of Hebrew derivatives in their 
speech, and of Hebrew ceremonies in their c~stoms,  
it has long been surmised that they were of Jewish 
degree. They style tliemselves Bani Israel, or 
children of Israel, affect to trace their descent from 
Saul, the king of Israel, and preserve among their 
traditions, amongst a medley of Mohammedan doc- 
trines, the accounts of the deliverance of Egypt, the 
ark of the covenant, and the names of the Philistines, 
Amalek, Anak, and others. Be this as it mny, 
history first recognizes the existence of tlle tribes 
called " Afghans," when they were settled at Ghor, 
in Western IChorassan, in tlie eighth century, and 
after becoming subject in turn to Delhi, and to 
Persia, they attained to independence by the daring 
of Ahmed Shah, an Afghan, who on the death of 
Nadir Shah, the I h g  of Persia, seized the vast 
treasure wlich the Persian army was carrying home 
from tlie plunder of India, and proclaiming himself 
King of tlie Afglians, readily united under him 
all the tribes of that name, and established with- 
in its present limits the indel~endent kingdom over 
<JF, STORMING TRE RHPBEB PASS. 11 
m d  is almost vhich Shere Ali Khan now rules. Between the 
mracter being clates of Ahmed Shah and Shere Ali Khan a, h~~nilred 
,ions to express and forty years have elapsed, marked throughout by 
. language have violent internal dissensions, resulting in frequent 
)riental tongue. changes of dynasty or frontier. The most important 
.atives in their was the overthrow of the Suclclozai family in 1839, ia- 
their customs, c asmuch as it led to British interference. Under the 
were of Jewish iul~ression that the rest oration of the Snddozai dy- 
ani Israel, or nasty would be pleasing to the Afghans, the British 
r descent from Government attempted the restoration of the deposed 
e among tlieir hneer, Shah Shuja, hoping also, by thus consti- 
nmmedan doc- tuting a friendly power ill Afghanistan, to obtain a 
of Egypt, the permanent guarantee against tlie intrigues of R~~ss ia ,  
the Pliilistines, then threatening to occnpy Ichiva and disturb the 
is ns it may, Indian Prontier. 
of the tribes It is quite true that the most avfi~l disaster that 
ttleil at Ghor, ever befell the British army was ons resnlt of the first 
1 century, and occupsltion of Cabul : the tale mas written large in 
Dellii, and to blood on the monntains of the country. But it is no 
by the claring less true that, on the instant of the receipt of news a 
L the death of #k cryof fiercewrath broke &omour countrymen inIndia; 
ized the vast and, swift as tigers, an Army of Vengeance dnshed 
:arrying home 1111on the murdered den. The British infaniry 
liming himself rushed into the Ellyber Pass, and, scaling its cliffs, 
3ci under liim swept out tlie mountaineers from crevice and ravine, 
~blished with- while the main body, breaking down the barricades 
kingdom over I with which, in their impotent malignity, the hill- 
men hacl crotvclecl the Pass, hurried on toward the 
devoted city. The Ghilzais tried to oppose the aven- 
ging force at thc Jugdullah defile, but were hurled 
back upon the main army encaml~ed at Jngdeen. I n  
five days more, General Pollock mas upon them in 
their strengtl~. He inflicted a shattering defeat, sad 
then swept down on Cabul ; and the ruins in the capi- 
tal of the Arneer bear eloquent mitlless to this day of 
the completeness of our triumph stlld our retribn- 
tion. It has been forgotten by some that to enact that 
splendid vengeance, the British army had to march 
through the Punjab-not then a British province, but 
a possession of a dist~ffectecl, if not actually hostile 
government-and through the Khyber Pass, while it 
was still swarming with the very same men that a few 
months before hacl rnadc such easy prey of the 
blocked mass of f~~gitives, ancl were still exulting 
in the successful carnage. To-day, hovever, the 
circumstances are altogether changed ancl in our 
favour. .The Pnnjab is peacef~~lly in our possession, 
and affords us some of the finest soldiers in the 
vorld, the Sikhs, who hate the Afghans m<th a 
traditional hatred, and would prefer them to any 
other enemy. More than this, the Viceroy, Lord 
Lytton, has, with a wise foresight, s~~bsidized the 
Pass-men, who, while serving us, become, by that 
very fact, the enemies of the Afghans and their Ameer. 
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THEN AND NOW. 13 
S, 
This enmity, however, is no new thing, for, inter- 
woven in the early history of the country, are the 
feuds between the mountaineers of the Pass and the 
Afghans proper, fends arising from the contenlptuous 
refusal of the latter to recognize the former as 
clansmen of equal dignity of descent with them- 
e selves. Not only, therefore, are both the Punjab 
and the Pass friendly to us, but the Punjabis, and 
the Pass-men have grudges to pay off against the 
Afghans. 
It is to be noted that the advance of Generals 
Pollock and Nott was made in the month of Sep- 
t ember. 
Moreover, the Afghan war of 1839 was under- 
taken in an impulsive moment vith little forethongl~t 
and less afterthongl~t. Our chief ally, Runj eet 
Sing, died immecliat ely after its commencement, and 
the real hostility of the Sikhs did not remain long 
codcealed. The prince whom we championed was 
singalarly incompetent, and the prince vho opposed 
fh. 
us was remarkably able. There was no danger from 
Russia, and the Afghans therefore had full power of 
action. Yet with all these drawbacks, added to the 
non-existence of an Indus Valley Railway, and to 
the absence of an aclvantageous base in Khelat, we 
conquered Afgllanistm with n mere hanclf~~l of 
I 
soldiers, chiefly natives. The Afghans after the 
14 CABUL. 
storming of G h ~ ~ z n i  ever stood for a day against 
our troops. 
To return to the people, in their government and 
customs, they resemble othel. Mohammedan nations, 
but tllong11 proud of their devotion to Islam, they clo 
not hesitate to break all its laws mhen their inclina- 
tions prompt them. In  one respect notably, their largo 
cons~mption of intoxicating liquors, they habitually 
transgress their creed. In  character, the Afgh'm is 
bigoted and revengeful. His treachery is prover- 
bial iu the East, and hardly less notorious is his 
readiness to join in plunder or murder. Vlrithout 
being brave, in the sense that the long-endnring 
Sikh ancl patient Ghoorka are brave, he possesses a 
certain dashing boldness, wiiich the first reverse 
dissipates; and, thong11 boastf~~l in promises, is 
avaricious ancl mean iiz performance. His code of 
hospitality illustrates this trait. So long as the 
guest is under his roof, the Afghan will t ~ e a t  hinl as 
cz brother, ancl all the delicacies that the women in 
his harein can prepare-and every Afghan woman 
is a slrillecl cook-are at his service. But the 
moment that the stmnger has got a gunshot off, his 
whilom host, if he shoulcl have taken a fancy to his 
apparel, or snspectecl. the possession of money, will 
as cheerfully send a bullet into bis back as the clay 
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before he had liglltecl his pipe for him. By nature, 
ancl in many p u t s  of the country by profession, 
robbers ancl banditti, the smnllest pretext suffices to 
excite them to deeds of blood, ai~cl in their tribal 
ancl religions jealousies sucll pretexts are always at 
hand. As Sunnis they hold in detestation the 
adverse sect of $hias, ancl this difference of doctrine 
is at all times enough to justify plunder ancl murder, 
while from the many varieties of races living among 
and near them, excellent reasons for desolating a 
homestead, or Idling a traveller, are never wanting. 
I t  is sufficient excuse to an Afghan for firing his 
long-barrelled jizail at a stranger that the latter mears 
his turban differently to llimself-and is not looking. 
The turban is in Afghanistan what tlie tartan was 
in the Higl~lancls of Scotland, for each clau has 
its distinctive pattern of cloth and often a peculiar 
method of wearing it. These clans are very 
nnmerous, but group themselves roughly into no- 
mad ancl agrict~ltural communities* The foril~er 
are found chiefly in the wilcler cot~ntry of the Kho- 
rasan, where a more ample pasture is founcl than 
in the north, and where they can wander with their 
herds at will. Nominally, of course, they are under 
the government of the Ameer, but virtually they are 
rotahers of their own chiefs, through whom they 
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pay their tribute to the central authority, ancl nrllo 
have complete control over the mutnnl relations for 
peace or war of the v%rious tribes. They contribute 
a contingent to tlie regular army, aiicl form the bulk 
of the reserve militin. The maill portion of the 
regular army is drawn from the ngricultnral class; 
and, except as a soldier or a cultivator, the Afghan 
in his own country has no occupation open to him. 
Whether from vanity or from traclitional antipathy to 
useful labour, he refuses to follow any trade, ancl 
history gives ample precedents to justify us in refer- 
ring to this trait of character, the fact that the 
Afghans u e  the ruling race. In personal all- 
pearance few nntions in the world can compare mit'h 
these s~~bjects of the Ameer. Travellers agree in des- 
cribing both the men ancl women as remarkably hand- 
some, fair complexioned, ancl with dignified, aquiline 
features. In figure they are almost invariably mell- 
proportioned, tall, and muscular. With such ad- 
vantages it is not strange that the Afghan is pas- 
sionately addicted to all exercises that call for 
athletic limbs, sound l~mgs, and tongh sinews. 
Hunting and hawking are nationel nm~~sements, 
and, all kinds of sport aye pop~~lar ,  As horsemen 
they will compare with any races in Inch, or nrith 
onrselves; while as marksmen, whether with the 
who 
s for 
.bute 
bulk 
tho 
Lass ; 
ghan 
him. 
hy to 
, and 
:efer- 
; the 
land- 
~iline 
well- 
1 ad- 
I pas-. 
.1 for 
iemeja 
: wit11 
h the 
t SPORTS AND PASTIUES. 3, 17 
rifle, spear, or stone, they are remarkably proficient, 
With such tastes ancl pursuits heartiness in con- 
viviality is generally fo~~nil associated : b ~ ~ t  the 
Afghans, in ihoir boisterous clebauchery, distort this 
allliable trait into bestiality of the vilest dcscription. 
This is especially the case alllong the higher classes ; 
for the bulk of tbe pcople are unable £ram their ex- 
cessive poverty to inclulge their tnsies. As an 
evening amuseinent chess fincls favour with every 
grade; but, in common with all Orientals, the 
J Afghan prefers to listen to a story-teller to doing 
anything else. The interminable natnrc of Easter11 
tales, which go on from night to night, brcznchiiig 
off from the o~iginal nal.1.aiive at every opportunity 
into the adventures of other characters that happen 
1 to be intntroduced, wo111d be maddening to a Emo- 
ropean auclioncc ; but the Afghan, patient in tliis 
alone, lies on his sheepskin hour after hour quite 
content if sollle one in the company will oilly drone 
out the involved labyrinth of indecent episodes that 
110 calls a tale. 
The women are fair-complexioned, handsome, a~lcl 
1 of a good figure. They enhance tlieir charnis by all 
i11e a~tifices of cosmetics, dyes, and pictnresq~~e dress ; 
I and tatooing wit11 indigo, takes t l ~ e  place of tho patches once worn in England. The hair, worn in 
4 C 
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long plaits, is often aclornecl with tassels and rough 
but effective ornaments of metal or glass ; but the 
jealous seclusion in which the bitter classes are 
kept by their lords and masters, has prevented tra- 
vellers from obtaining details of personal appearance. 
The secl~~cied and idle life they are forced to lend 
within the religionsly guarded ' haram,' influences 
their moral character very injuriously; and since 
they know they are not tmsted, they cio not care to 
gain the confidence of their masters. Intrigues are 
consequently of corninon occurrence, though, on 
cliscove~y the parties are most severely punished, 
usually with death. Yet the ,zccolzzplishment of 
their forbidden desires is often the daily occupation 
of the innlntes of lnany a ' haram,' and ihe licen- 
tiousness of the men and their neglect of their wives 
tends to increase the frequency of such ; liaisons,' 
and affords opportunities for their concealment." 
, The men sometimes dye their hands and feet mith 
" henna " (the leaves of the Lavsonia enennis), 
and also apply " surma " (powdered antimony) or 
" kohl " (lampblack), to the edges of the eyelids. 
These personal embellishments, howevel-, belong Inore 
properly to the women, and are onlypractisecl by those 
of the sterner sex who live in towns and cities, and 
a Bellezo. 
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even among them the habit is by 110 means general. 
Those wlzo adopt it are considered fops ancl effe- 
minate. But among the wornenthese arts of the toilet 
are universally observed, The women also are gene- 
rallymore or lesstattooed permaneatly~thincligo. A 
few dots are nsnally punctured on the chin, and on the 
foreheacl at the root of the nose. Frequently a few are 
marked on the skin between the breasts, and iu the 
same nzanner rings are marked on the fingers, wrists 
and &rmg. The complexion of the women of the 
better classes is very fair, and sometimes even rosy, 
thong11 nsnally a pale, sallow colonr prevails. The 
features are generally handsome, and like those of 
the men have a Jemish cast, ancl their fascinating 
glances are enhanced by the use of the snyma ancl 
kohl above mentioned. These substances impart to 
the eyes a peculiar charm alld captivating lustre, 
mixed with n spark of " diablerie " when their owner 
is animated, vllich are considered essentials in the 
qualities of a beautiful woman, ancl objects of ad- 
miration to the otlier sex generally. 
Next to the Afghans, the T + k  of Persian origin 
are the most numerous class of the Ameer's subjects. 
Physicnlly, they rival the Afghans in graces of 
persons, but differ from them widely in character and 
habits. As a rnle they are nn orderly and law- 
c 2 
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nbiding race, and though as ignorant ancl super- 
stitious as their neighbonrs, are less turbulent ancl 
bigoted. I n  the rnral ciistricts they follow agriculture 
as a profession, and in t o m s  occnpy themselves in 
any trade or ind~~stry. A considerable number join 
the army, in which they are known as Toorks, and 
not a few are to be found serving in the Punjab 
branch of the Blitish force. Among the remaining 
elements of the population of Afghanistan, the 
Xazzilbash Moghul and the Huzara tribes deserve 
s~ecia l  notice. The former are of Turki origin, 
and wherever they go enjoy the reputation of being 
splendid soldiers. In the irregular cavalry of India, 
one of the finest arms of any service, they are nlarlted 
men, and in Afghanistan they form the bulb of the 
cavalry and artillery forces in the Ameer's service. 
The Huzaras are of Tartar descent, as theb unpre- 
possessing features and diminutive stature abun- 
dantly testify. They serve the other races as menials, 
and, as such, are looked upon as fzitldul and docile. 
In independence, however, they display a remarkable 
hatred of the Afghans, who, oming to the savage 
daring shown by these rno~~nt~~lkeers, have never 
been able to pierce to the strongholds. 
Brief as are these sketches of the chief races of 
Afghanistm they suffice to show how the popnlntion 
in, 
ng 
ia, 
:ed 
he 
:e. 
re - 
Ln - 
,Is, 
.le. 
ble 
iT er 
* GOVERNMENT AND LAWB. 21 
contaills within itself all the elements of intestine 
discorcl. and nono of cohesion in a common canse. 
Tile Sunni Afghaus at a word mould turn in the 
1 name of religion upon the Shia Moghuls ; while the Hnzaras, and besides them the Hindu tribes scattered 
1 about the co~nbry would readily, in the hope of 
I 
+ plunder, fight against both. 
I 
i The Afghans, in fact, are incapable of resisting 
I 
I a Enropean invasion, whether it come from Kho- 
1 
9 
kand or the Pnujab. They could contribute very 
materially to the defence of tlleir Fatherland, if it 
be undertaken by a firm ally. They can, for in- 
stance, enable England to defend the line of the 
Oxus, and Balkh, *or Badakshan, or they could per- 
form the same service to Russia, garrisoning Cabnl 
or Ghnzni. They exercise the two enormous advan- 
tages of being on the spot, and of lulowing the 
country. 'But it cannot be denied, that this is the 
utmost Cabnl can do, and that we have too per- 
sistently exaggeratecl. the difficulties of occupyiug 
Afghanistan onrselvcs. 
In  their governmellt and lams the Afghans are 
guided by the precepts and ordinances of the 
Mohammedan religion and Koran codes. The 
priesthoocl. are the expositors, and, in most cases 
also, the administrators of the law. The king 
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governs the country by the aid of provincial gover- 
nors, who are responsible to him for the revenues 
of the provinces under their respective charge, 
and also for the efficiency of the military forces 
under theis cominand. The surplus revenues, after 
defraying the expenses of the govelument, are 
added to the imperial treasury, which is for the 
support of the royal family, and is entirely at the 
disposal of the king. These provincial governors 
generally, and more particularly those at a distance 
from Cabul, oppress the people for theis own ag- 
grandizement, and often defy the authority of the 
king, and assert their own independence. This is 
especially the case with that portion of the nation 
occupying the mountain barriers of the kingdom. 
Few of these tribes pay revenue to the Cabul 
government without coercion, and the difficulties 
attending its collection are so great that they are, 
for the most part, left alone for many years together, 
or until the imperial excheq~~er requires replenish- 
ing, and opportunity off'ers, when a force is marched 
to the refractory district, and by fair means or foul, 
makes up the ayrears of revenue by a general 
plunder of its inhabitants. 
At the seat of government the Iring is assisted by 
his " Wazir," or prime minister ; the " Mir 
M~~nshi," or secretary of state ; and thc " Kiizi," 
THE A ~ ~ E E R ' S  ARMY. 23 
or chief jndge and priest, who snperintends the 
department of lam ancl religion. The details are 
transacted by his ( (  Nhib," or depnty, assisted by 
the ( (  Mufti " for law, ancl the ((  Sheik " or ( (  Imam " 
for religion. All the officials connected with these 
departments are compreheilsively styled ( (  'Ulama " 
or Doctors of the Law. 
The military forces of Afghanistan consist of a 
reg~zlar standing army and of a militia. The former 
comprises some seventeen or eighteen reginleilts of 
infantry, dressed, drilled, and equipped in imitation 
-a sorry one though it be-of the British army, 
whose cast-off ancl conclelnnecl clothing they buy up 
on the frontier stations of India alld adopt as their 
nniform-a proof of the prestige that the British 
recl-coat still maintains in their country. Besides 
these, there are three or four regiments of light 
clragoons got up after the same model ; also a small 
force of artillery, with perhaps a total of 100 pieces 
of cannon, chiefly of brass, ancl home-inade. The 
Afghans have, however, a few iron guns ; bnt thoy 
are very old and msty, ancl probably as dangerous 
to themselves as to their enemies. The army is 
supposed to be under the direct command-iu-chief 
of the king ; but the regimental commands are dis- 
tributed among the princes of the blood and the 
governors of the different provinces into wliicli the 
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conntry is divided, vithont respect to their mili- 
tary qnalifications or capacities for command, The 
internal economy of the regiments is carried on 
by the commanclant, styled " Kom6diin," and is in 
accordance with his own ideas on the subject, and 
he is assisted by a body of comlnissioiled and non- 
comivissioiled officers, who are solnetimes selected 
by merit, though, as a rule, they get their appoint- 
ments through interest as blood-re1 8, t' ions or as 
slaves, or else as partisans of the chief in corninand. 
The arms and uniforlns of the soldiers are provided 
by Government, at a fixed price, which is deducted 
from tlieir pay. The arms, like the uniform, are for 
the ivost part derived from the British. Tliey are 
the old flint-lock musket or smooth-bore percussion 
guns.' These last, however, are little used, as the 
Afghans have not yet succeeded in manufacturing 
caps for them, and can depend but upon a very small 
supply from the British. Of late years they have 
turned out a nuivber of two-grooved rifles and car- 
bines both at Cabul and Candahar, on the pattern 
of those used by the frontier corps of the British 
Indian army; but as before noted there is a diffi- 
cult;~ in the finpply of percnssioil caps for them. 
* I t  must not bo forgotten t h a t  we have given the Ameer 
about 20,000 rifles, Enfield find Snider, with ammunition; and 
also n field battery of guns. 
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The pay of tl:e rcgnlar army is for the most part 
settled by a cash papnent ; in many cases grants 
of rent-free lancls are made instead. On these re- 
side the familias of the soldiery, or else the lands 
are hired out by tl1e111 to farmers. The infantry is 
for the most part composed of true Afghans of 
various tribes, though amongst tllern are many Tajiks 
and a fern Persians. The latter, ancl the Tartars, 
are mainly found in the ranks of the cavalry ancl 
artillery forces, of which, indeed, they constitute the 
bulk ; whilst in the ranlw of the three divisions of the 
army are to be found many Hindostanes who llavc 
desertecl from the ranks of the British Indian army. 
The militia force is a very numerous body, the 
numbers of which it is very difficult to ascertuin. 
But in case of foreign invasion it would inclucle al- 
most the entire male polsnlation between the ages of 
sixteen and sixty. Their arms are the " jazail," or 
long Afghan rifle ; the sworcl, or, in its stead, the 
" charall," or Afghan knife, ancl the shield. The 
yeomanry division of this force, though sometimes 
they carry the rifle, are, as a rule, only armed with 
the lance, SWOPCI, pistols, or the bl~~nclerbuss 
with bell-shaped muzzle. 
The militia are supposed to owe allegiance to the 
king, and, in case of neecl, to protect him and the 
country from foreign invasion. In  tmth, however, 
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they are under t l ~ e  direct control and command of 
the chiefs of their respective tribes, vhose interests 
are identical with their o m ,  ancl under whose sian- 
dards accorclingly they range tl~emselves as fencla- 
tories. Indeecl, the coinposition of this force is very 
anomalous. As a mass they are little, if at all, 
nncler the control of the king or his governlneilt, and 4 
are moreover divided amongst tl~emsclves according 
to the opposing interests of their different tribes and 
clans. The militia provide their o m  arms, ancl re- 
ceive no pay except when on active service for the 
St ate. Their tribal chiefs, however, receive grants 
of rent-free lands in their respective territories by 
way of military fief. 
From the foregoing pa,rticulars it will be noted 
that the Afghan army is an armed, and for the most 
part nndisciplinecl mass, with divided and often con- 
flicting interests, and, consequently, not at all times 
to be clepended on for its fidelity to the king or his 
government. Indeed from the fact of their being 
more or less nnder the control of their o m  tribal t 
chiefs (wl~o, themselves, are mere feudatories of the 
king-sometimes snpporting, and at others resisting 
his authority), they look to them as their real I 
masters, and accordingly, espouse their cause, what- I 
ever-it may be. It is owing. to this power of the I 
vm-ions tlibnl chiefs that they are so often refractory 
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-so jealous of each other, and so constantly in- 
triguing for asceudailcy in the councils or govern- 
lnellt of the country. And this is moreover the main 
cause of the weakness of the Cab111 government, 
for its authority does not extend much beyond the 
capital and the acljacent provinces, unless backed 
4 by troops to enforce compliance. 
Such, in brief, are some of the peculiarities of the 
armed forces of Afghanistan. a As a military power 
they are contemptible (at least at the present clay) 
anywhere but on their o m  hills. Even the Kaffirs 
-a savage race inhabiting the southern slopes of 
the Hincli~ Ki~sh, and whose only weapons 'are the 
bow and arrow, atones, mcl the dagger-have, times 
svithout number, proved a formidable foe, and, in 
truth, more than a match for the Afghans, as 
those of this race whom the Afghans own as valued 
and faithful slaves, they have acquired' not by their 
superiority in fair fight, but by base treachery and 
intrig~~e."~ 
1. The Anzee~ and his Fc~nzi1y.-It is now Bteen years 
ago since Shere Ali Khan, dashing at Caldahar 
to punish the rebel chiefs who bacl disputed his 
snccession to the throne, sank in the hour of 
victory into an abyss of grief, counting as nothing 
his brilliant lviiitary success since it cost him his 
Belb~o. 
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first-born-the heir to his throne. . The gallant 
youth, Mahomed Ali IChnn, had sought out the 
loader of the rebels ill single combat, and after a 
fierce fight in which he three times mounded his 
antagonist, mas shot dead, and his father, in the 
extremity of his sorrow, abandoned his ariny and his 
kingdom to their fate, refusing for sevcral days t o  
see even n human face. Three sons, it is trne, still 
remained to him, but so completely had his affec- 
tions been centered in the one that was gone, that 
he could not look on either of the others as his 
snccessor. A fourth son was in time born, and t o  
him, the child of a favonrite wife, he gave both his 
heart and throne. The one gift has already more 
than once nearly cost the other, for the clis- 
inhcrited sons sornc seven years ago alnlost shook the 
aceptre from his hand by their snccossf~ll revolt. 
But death has now removed the object of theil* envy. 
Abclullah Jan, tlie son of the Anleer's favourite vife, 
the daughter of the Ncer Afznl Khan, governor of 
Fnrrah, was proclaimed heir-apparent in 1873, and 
to secure his succession his father imprisoned one 
son and drove a second into exile. But " fate " has 
proved too pomerf~ll for the b e e r .  
I t  is a picturesqne history this that closed at the 
grave of the Ameel-'s favonrite son. His brave 
mother, a lady of the noble Barnkzai stock, had 
worked well in.her husband's cause when that cause 
seemed clesperate, and Shere Ali mas a wanderer in 
his onrn kingdom ; for it was she who kept the camp 
sn~plied with money, and the dethronecl rnler well- 
informed of the movements of the enemy and the 
intrigues of the court. When, therefore, Shere Ali 
returned in triumph to his capital she claimed as 
her remard the elevation of her son to the throne, 
and the promise then given in 1869 was perfarmed 
in 1873. At the great festival of the Eed, and in 
the presence of all the Moslem city, the Ameer 
solemnly placed in the hands of the lad,Abdl~llahJan, 
the Koran and the sword which his father, Dost 
Mnhomecl, had in the sake wny placed in his, as 
the insignia of heirship, some thirty years before. 
Three years Inter his health began to fail, he became 
subject to fevers and rheumatic attacks, and to these 
causes, perhaps, is due the death which a month 
ago turned the eyes of Asia to the capital of 
Afghanistan. Not less picturesque is the story of 
the Aineer's own life, nnd the lessons to be drawn 
from it are such as should have warned Shere Ali 
agninst disregarding claims of succession. 
The Arneep Dost Mahomed died in 1863 at 
Herat after subduing that revolted province, and left 
many sons, the most notable in history being 
Mahomed Afznl Khan and Mahomed Azim 
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Khan, sons by nn elder wife, ancl Sl~ere Ali ICl~nn, 
son by a younger ancl favonritc wife. By the law 
of primogeniture Afzul Khan shonlcl have succeeded, 
but Shere Ali had been declared by his father, 
cluring his lifetime heir-apparent, and so on the 
death of Dost Maholllecl a styife at once com- 
menced for the throne; but, after the manner of 
Eastern royal houses, the struggle was not confinecl 
to the principals concernecl, for every scioll of the 
dynasty struck a blow for incliviclual inclepellclence ; 
one in Tnrkistan, another in Kurr~ulin, a thircl in 
Canclahar, and a fourth in Furrah and Girishk-the 
four outlying provinces snborclinate to the Cabul 
Alneer. Shere Ali, himsclf, on ascending the throne 
complicatecl tlic embroglio by again subverting the 
natural order of succession, for l ~ e  appointed as 
governor of the lately acqnirecl territory of Herat 
his yo~tngest son, Yakub Khan. But the disaffected 
chiefs, concerting colnbinecl action, ancl aided by the 
ruler of Bofiara, lying on the northern frontier of 
Afghanistan, raisecl the standard of revolt simul- 
taneously in every proviilce. 
Obstinate ill-fortune followed Shere Ali's arms ; 
and at last Afzul IChan was proclaimed under a 
roysll salute Ameer of Afghanistan. The new ruler, 
however, alienated the affections of his subjects vllo 
once more cast their eyes towards the exiled Shere 
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Ali. But the fortunes of war were still against the 
eu-Ameer, who suffered in lserson a decisive defeat 
in January, 1867, while his general, after gaining 
two victories, was finally defea,ted in September. 
Afzul Khan died at Cabul in October, and Azim 
Khan, at the bear1 of a victorious asnly, formally 
assumed the throne of Afghnnistan. Sliere Ali was 
at this time in Tnrkistan, and l i s  soil Yakub Khan 
at Herat, and against these the new ruler now 
directed his army. But Shere Ali, waiting till Abdul 
Rahman was well into Turlcistan, slipped past him 
into Cabul, and while the Turldstan chiefs lrept the 
enemy occupied, he despatclled Yakub Khan against 
Candahar. That gallant soldier defeated the forces 
opposed to him, and then Shere Ali, leaving his son 
Ibrahim Khan at Herat, marched upon Candahar, 
which he entercd in trinillph in June, 1868 ; and a 
snccessf~~l intrigue soon after leacling to the muti~ly 
of the army at Cabul, the capital also declarcc1 for 
Shere Ali, wlio thus in September re-entered Cabul 
as Ameer. 
To s~~ccccd Sliere Ali in that dignity there are 
three claimants. The first, in point of strength of 
claim, is Ahlned Mi, the son of Shere Ali's eldest 
son Maliomed Mi Khan, who fell ill 1865, fighting 
so bsavely on the field of Kajbaz. For his father's 
sake, and, perhaps, also because the child proved 
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himself intelligent and adventurous, Shere Ali has 
always shown his grandson especial favour, and as 
late as 1871 it appeared as if his choice were not 
yet made up, mhether Ahmed Ali or Abdullah Jan  
should be declared the heir-apparent. The former, 
indeed, avowedly entertained hopes of the successioil 
until the superior influence of the mother of Abdullah 
Jan obtained the throne for her soil to his exclusion, 
and now that the rival is dead his hopes of heirship 
may with reason be revived. Ahmed Ali is described 
as an intelligent youth of about eighteeli with ,z 
pleasing demoanour, and fairly well educated. The 
mother of Abdullah Jan  is said to have another son 
still living, but incapacitated for rule by being 
totally deaf and dumb. 
Yakub Khan was born in the year 1849, of a, 
noble mother. His first appearance in public life 
may be said to be the occasion when he detected 
the European beneath the disguise of the der- 
vish, mcl despite the flueacy and nerve of Armi- 
nius Vambkry. That was in November, 1863, ,$ 
mhea the Afghan prince appeared to the traveller, 
" a good-humoured, inexperienced child." Since 
then, whether he has retained his good humour or 
not, he has certainly acquired a vast experience of 
life's vicissitudes. His career in the history of his 
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colultry commenced very shortly after liis inter- 
view with the Hungarian traveller ; for in 1864 
Shere Ali's brothers disl~uted his possession of the 
croma, and Yalwb Khan was left in command, 
at tlie age of fifteen, of Herat, and showed himself 
no l s u l ~ ~ e t  in office, for, discoveri~lg a collepiracy 
against his power, he 11unished the guilty with a 
severity that astonislied his co~~ncil  and gained him 
pnblic confidence. At eighteen he was corninancXng 
n large force in the field, ancl i t  is allowed on all 
hands that to thc lad's pop~dwity nlld energy mas 
owilig the sudden revival of Shere Ali's inflnence,' 
and to liis clash and gallantry the return of Sllere 
Ali to his thronc. BLI~ in 1870, disgusted at his 
father's preference for his younger brother, he re- 
belled, and, by his personal. favour with tlze people 
aiid military skill, seriously imperilled his father's 
tenure of power by tlie capt~uc of EIerat. In the 
very hour of success, however, lie declared himself 
penitent and dismissed 11% ariny; but ihe old dis- 
contcut once more overl~owered him, ancl his father, 
becoming suspicious, suminoned him to Cabul. 
Y a l r ~ ~ b  Khan, having obtained Shere Ali's promise 
that  he should not be molested, obeyed the summons 
ancl vns t l~~osvn at  once into prison. He is nov 
thirty years of age, if he is alive, Therc is, of course, 
D 
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no  roof that he has been murclerecl in prison, nor 
is there any spccial ground for snpposing that, after 
the manner of Eastelv captives whose intelligence is 
dcemed dangerous by the mler, his rcason has given 
way during his confinement ; but should either 
event prove to have occurred, ancl Yakub I<haa be 
dead or renclerecl imbecile by torture, there will be 
nothing in thiut to surprise the student of Afghan 
listorg in general, or of the character of Shere Ali 
in particular. Personally, Yalrub Khan has a 
pleasant address, ancl .is admittccl on all hands 
r" to be the most intelligent of tlie Cabul grhces. 
Of lcs generalship there can be only one 
opinion, wllile as m administrator he has more than 
once proved himself both capable and long-sighted. 
Haughty ancl rcvengef~~l, as all Afghans are, he is 
distinguishcd from the majority of his co~~nt ry-  
Inen by his frankness, liberality, and enterprise. 
There are some who declare that Yakub Khan has 
loudly proclaimed his hostility to England, and Shere 
Ali himself encleavo~~red once to make him appear as 
a Rnssophile. On the other hand, he is saicl to have 
cxpressccl in 1872 to Captail1 Marsh very friendly 
sentiments towards US, and to have commenced the 
~ h i . ~ u t h o r  of "A Ride through Islam." 
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study of English in proof of his good feelings ton~arcls 
our country ! 
The third clftiillant will be Abdnl Rshman, the 
eldest son of Shere Ali's eldest brother. By birth 
he might, elsewhere than in Cabul, assert certain 
rights ; but where the sceptre goes to the strongest 
L' plimogenit~~re coullts for little, wllile in his personal 
history Abdul Rahman bas certainly no claims to 
favour. His whole life has been marked by stubborn 
opposition to Shere Ali, against whom he saccess- 
f111ly excited a revolt in 1865. Having occupied 
T~rkis tan,  he ufnrched on Cabul, overthrew Shere 
Ali, nt the battle of Shekabad, and, releasing his 
father Afznl I(hz11 from prison, placed hiin on the 
throlle of Cabul. But Afzul Khan's incapacity 
gave his brother Azim I<han su1)reme power, and 
with hiin Abdul Rahinan q ~ ~ a ~ ~ e l l e d  in consequence. 
A teinpornry reconciliation-during vhich he twice 
defeated Sbere Ali and his generals-resulted in 
renewed hostilities ; ancl whe7n, d te r  his father's 
death, Aziin Kllsm, l i s  uncle, assumed the title of 
Alneer of Cabul, be retired illto Tnrlristan ; Shere 
Ali, meanwhile, vas recovering his power, alld 
Abdul Ralllnan, finding his nriny melting from him, 
proceeded to Ichiva, hoping there to secure sufficient 
adherents to enable hh11 to obtain possession of 
D 2 
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Tnrkistan. His movements since that date have 
been obscured by mnnr rumonrs, and the only facts 
beyond all doubt are that his time is spent in 
alternate intrigues with the Tnrkomans ancd the 
Russians, ancd that his one object is to disturb 
the peace of Afghaaistau. I n  May, 1870, he 
was entertained kindly by General Kauffman at 
Sarnarcancd, ancd since that date has repeatedly asked 
for Russian help to assist him to conquer Afghan- 
istan, never ceasing to beg that he might carry his 
case to St. Petersburg, ancd even boasting, ~vitli the 
view of increasing his personal importance with the 
Tnrkomans, that he is in the pay of the Rnssian 
government. His military abilities mark llim out 
as a dallg.erons enemy in the field, but, politically 
ancl socially, his influence cannot now stand so high 
as when, fifteen years ago, fighting for his father, he 
carried with liim the syi~ipathy of the majority of the 
Afghans. At that cdate ihe cause of Shere Ali, as 
shown by his loss of his throne in the successful 
interpolation of two b e e r s  of the elder stock, was 
undoubtedly unpopular ; mcl Abdul Rahm an, had 
he struck for the throne for himself, as being the 
elder son of the eldest son, might have permanently 
displaced Shere Ali. As it is, Shere Ali has now 
obtained that Russian alliance ancl friendship vliich 
Abclul Rahman has during all his outlaved life been 
striving for. Bnt if, casting about for a successor 
vho sl~all at the same time be acceptable to Russia 
and clistastef~~l to England, the present Ameer shonld 
select Abdul Rahman, there would in the choice be 
nothing extraordinary. 
Receizt Histo~y : Rz~ssin 012 the Afghniz Fvo~ztic~-.- 
The stupicl catchword of " masterly inactivity" has 
been adopted to designate a policy of which Sir John 
Lawrence (in vhose defence ill-informed p EU st' isans 
persist in quoting it) had grown heartily sick in 1867. 
He then advised active interference in Cal~ul affairs, 
and Sir Stafford Northcote agreeing, it mas arranged 
to subsidize the Ameer Shere Ali. Lorcl Mayo 
arrived in January, 1869, and to him therefore it 
fell to carry ont Lord Lavrence's active policy. 
Hc met Shere Ali at Umballa, in March, and so far 
accedecl to the Ameer's earnest desire for an 
offensive and defensive treaty, as to give a written 
declaration that the British government " would view 
mith severe displeasure any attelnpt on tlle part of 
his rivals to disturb his position." This declaration 
Shere Ali exaggerated into acquiescence mrith his 
clemancls, ancl, contented mith it, as witli the royal 
subsiclies extended to him, dicl not bring formard 
directly the question of Abclnlla,l~ Jan's succession, 
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nrhicb, as a matter of fact, had formed, to his omn 
mind, the special object of his .irisit to Lorcl Mayo. 
His satisfaction was justified by the ~ulprecedented 
throng of nobles that crowded on his return to do 
liolnnge to tile hononrecl guest and presumed ally 
of tlle Viceroy of Hindustan. 
On the very day of the Umbnlla conference, really 
concerted with reference to the advances of Russia, 
Lord Clarendon commenced the correspondence with 
Rnssia as to the limits of the Asiatic boundaries of 
the tmo powers, which after some riclicnlous errors 
of geography owing to the use of a wrongly-coloured 
map, :mcl solne discussion as to a " nentral zone " 
betweell the two territories, resulted in the settlement 
of the Oxus as the northern bo~mdary of Shere Ali's 
dominions (along two-Chirds of its extent), Russia 
conceding to the b e e r  his right to Badakshan ancl 
Wakhan,z and recognizing their fkontiers as the 
' Wnlrhan is a slndl territory lying north of the LliudQ 
Kbsh, between the Chitral country and the Pamir Khanate of 
Shagnnn. The importance of Walthan is twofold. I n  the 
first place, it holds the southern route of the caravan trade 
between. Eastern Turlristan and Western Turkistan, and 
Afghanistan. In the second place, i t  commands the northern 
entrance to the Baroghil Pass leading from Kashgar to the 
Chitral Valley. For both of these reasons Wakhan is of im- 
portance to this country. Regarding it from a purely his- 
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line of demarcation which limits her own dependen- 
cies of IChokancl and 130khara to the south. Prince 
Gortchalroff then formally ancl spontaneously dc- 
clared that " Afghanistan was completely outside the 
sphere within mhich she might be called upon to 
exercise her influence." HOM far this is true mecl 
hardly to-day be pointed out. 
Nor does the Czar shine as a man of honouy 
in the next Central Asia manceuvre-the >eizare of 
Khivs. I11 1869 a Russian detachment establishecl 
itself on the eastern shore of the Caspian, the Czar 
assuring England "for entirely commercinlpul~poses. ' '
Beco~noitring, liotvever, co~nmencecl at once, and mi- 
litary posts were extended eastward, until three years 
later Russia found herself strong enougli to resort to 
torical stand-point, Wnlrhnn must be admitted to  be a 
portion of the Afghan empire, although, perhaps, ethno- 
logically, it should form one of n confederation of mountain 
states which should extend from Swat to Karategin. The 
strntegical importance of Walrhan will become very clear 
should Russia absorb Ktlrategin alone; but if Darwnz ancl 
Shngnan are to share the samo fate then our eye will have 
to be constantly fixed upon the whole northern frontier fro111 
Pamir to Merv. Froin Wakhan, now a border province of the 
Chinese empire, to the Tarkomnn country round Merv, there 
stretches n broad nnd clearly defined zone, on which may be 
written at any point "high road to Iudia." 
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force in her designs. Four converging columns, any 
one of mhichwonlcl have sufficed for the purpose, closed 
on Iaiva, and the crushing terms in money ancl terri- 
tory iinposed on the conquered, destroyed the iade- 
penclence of the state, as well as the last shreds 
of respectability still hanging abont Che Czar's oath. 
More important, politically, to British India thnil 
the seizure of Khiva, is the snbjugation of the TLIS~O- 
mans, which it  has been foreseen by ' I  the detractors 
of Russian honour" must follow. The trnth mas, that 
the original northern line of Russian aclvsnce (wl~ich 
started from the centre of the Caspian) toward the 
Afghm frontier (foi' this has been from first to last 
the goal of Rnssin) was found to be inconvenient-a 
vast desert intervening ; another line was tl~ercfore 
opened, the pliability of Persia being first establislled 
beyond clispute. Starting therefore this time from 
the extreme sontll of the Caspian, the advance has 
been pushed eastward along the Attrek River, the 
northern boundmy of Persia, in the direction of Mcrv, 
mhich. is only four marches fiom the OXIIS, ancl ten 
easy stages fro111 Herat, " the key of Cabnl.'? Along 
this route lie the popnlons dolnains of tho Yomnt, 
Goklan ancl Tekkeh Tnrkomnns, aggregating over n 
million souls. The two former mere rapidly reduced 
to comparative subjection, but the latter still hold out. 
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When they are overpowered, Russia vill have free way 
t o  Merv, where, strengthening herself, she can nvait 
the moment for seizing Herat by n cozq-de-nzailt. The 
vast TnrBomsln contingent at  her disposal, under the 
commancl of Abclul Rnhmm, thc rebel nephew of 
Shere Ali, nom in the Russian camp, ancl a leader of 
T~zrkomans from his youth up, vould ennble Russia 
to wage, 3t no cost to herself, an extensive unofficial 
war, and absolutely control both Cabul and Persia." 
Successive annexations since the h ~ a s i o a  of 
Kl~iva in 1873, with the virtual mediatixntion of 
Bolchara, have given Russia the choicc of three 
routes to the neighbourhood of Afghcmistan. Shc 
cominnnds a road by Charjui t o  Merv, and thence 
t o  Herat, a seconcl by Ka~khi  to Anclchuj, and a 
' The 2tcJian Woo7cly Review makes, x i t h  reference to tho 
Russiau movements, tho following original and sagacious 
comment :-" There is another point to be  considered, 
xhich is, that  i t  u-ould be hardly vor lh  the while of t h e  
Russinns to  go some 2.50 miles out of their way to E e r n t  
in order to t u r n  the  Bamian wl~ilo a tolerably direct route 
exists frotn Bnllrh or from IClilutn lying just south of the  
ferries to Cabul. IVIoreover, a move by Hera t  o r  to Ixernt 
would nt once rouse England to  its centre ; rrhereas in the 
case of Bnllrh or  Khulm, although absolutely nearer to OLTY 
frontier, the names of the places are unknown to  the majollity 
of Englishmen a t  home, and the  danger might no t  be seen 
unt i l  the aeizu~e had been nccomplisl~ed." 
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thircl by Xhoja Salih to Bnlkll ancl the Bamian Pass. 
The steamboat service on Lake Aral and the Oxus 
voulcl co-operate in conveying s~~pplies. As far as 
the Hinclh Kt~sh the course of a Rnssian army is 
fairly open, The short linc that already exists 
between Poti and Tiflis foms  a ready base for further 
extensions, and the true importance of Batoum is as 
a suitable terminus for a railway to Erivan, Tabriz, 
ancl Teheran. The great sche~ve of the line beyond 
Orenbnrg may be considered as permanently shelved. 
But railways from Erivan, though Azerbijan, 
Ghilan, Mazanderan, nnd Khorassan are not 
open to nny lvomentous objections, while they 
cannot fail to be botli politically and strategically 
of the highest importance. We inay 11ass 
over the Orenburg-Khiva-Merv line to Hernt 
as purely visionary, and we may ignore also the 
scheme for connecting Samarcand with Cabul ; 
but it would not bc prudent to remain equally 
inclifferent to the third proposed line that is to 
P ~ S S  from Erivnn to Teheran, and thence to Herat. 
At the present time it is incontestable that a 
scheme for a railway from Telzeraii to Herat 
receives additional significance from the fact that 
the Russian envoy to Cab111 was said to have in - 
structions to cleivaucl the right to station Russian 
sian 
agencies in the north-vest of Afgl~mistau, nncl to 
visit Herat and the neigl~bourhoocl ;" whither, for all 
we lcnom to the contrary, he may llave gone ere 
this. 
In  January, 1873, the agent of the Alneer visited 
Lord Northbrook nt Simla, ancl it soon became ap- 
4 parent tliat the Alneer mas then a very different 
individual from the Arneer of 1569. His four years 
of ~~nchallenged rule had relieved him from a11 ills- 
~rehensiou of rivals, and llad made him lsroncl and 
self-roliant, I t  had also given him an insight into 
foreign politics, which renilered him not only ex- 
travagant in his demands, but stubborn in pressiug. 
those demands, and sullen mllen they were negatived. 
He had, in fact, learned that in Englmd there vas 
a party which deprecated all action i ~ 1  defence of 
British interests. Accorclingly, in spite of the 
splendid liberalily with which he was trented- 
for he received 120,0001. and 15,000 rifles, En- 
fields and Sniders-he sullrod, refused at first to 
? take our subsidies, ordered t8hc British llzissioa 
under Forsyth, returning from lcashgar, out of his 
territories, ancl otherwise demeaned himself as a 
beggnr proverbially does wllcn lslaced in the saddle. 
He opened a treasonable corresponclence with the 
Russians and colvllzelltecl in his letters t o  General 
'T 
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Knuffman contemptnonsly on British procedure, 
The veneer of the Mnyo memory had worn off. 
Sllere Ali begnn to remember that he had ancient 
grudges agninst us, and he catnlognocl. thein a l ~ d  
shouted them out. H e  had gone mad, for the gods 
had resolved upon his ruin. " I have seven crores * 
of mpees by me, every rupee of which I will hurl at 
tho head of the Eritisli government ; and I will roll 
the border tribes ngainst them like blasts of fire." 
Tlzc Anzeel-'s '' Gj.ievnnces .' '-VVhenDost Malloin ec7, 
the father of t,he present Ameer, died in 1863, 
Lord Lawrence recognizecl. Sliere Ali as his 
snccessor. The throne, liomever, vas  soon 
shaken under him, and two usurpers in succes- 
sion ruled in Cabul, Shere Ali being n~eanmhilo 
an exiIe in Tnrkistan, and Lorcl. Lamrence re- 
cognized first one and then the other as Ameer. 
Shere Ali, thanlrs to his son, Yalmb Khan, regaincd 
the  tholie, and tllough he in llis turn vns again 
hailed as Ameer by the Indian Government, he had 
not forgotten that an equally ready recognition ltnd 
strengthened his two predecessors against him. In- 
deed, the rem~rnbr~mce of that pitif111 policy -was so 
vivicl. in the Ameer's mincl. in 1869, vhen he tisitcd 
Lord Mayo at Umballa, that he dicl. not hesitate to 
F. THE EMBASSY TO WAKHAN. 4 5 
spmnlr bitterly of it t o  the Viceroy. This was his 
first grievance against ns. But Lord Mayo won the 
Afghan's heart by the royal welcome and entertain- 
llleilt tllat mas extended to him, and Sllere Ali re- 
turned home pleased for the time, if not conthted. 
But the first qnestion asked of him on his arrival st 
6, Cabul was, " Did the Indian government recognize 
Abcl~lllah Jan as your heir ? " nncl Shere Ali hncl to 
confcss that the chief object of his visit to Ull~balla 
had not been attained-t,hat, indeed, he had not 
eve11 seriously broached the subject of the heil-ship 
at the Dnrbar. The cliploinacy that had thus bnfaecl 
him Shere Ali in time grew to look upon as n 
personal wrong, and in his formal catalogue of 
grielrances against the Indian government it stands 
second on the list. 
Pive others find a prominent place, namely, the 
despatch of art embassy direct to the Mir of WaB- 
han insteacl of throngh himself as that chief's snze- 
rain ; the mediation of Lord Northbrook for Yalc~~b 
\ I a a n  when he was imprisoned by his father ; the 
Seistan arbitration, when that province, in dispnte 
between Cabnl ancl Persia, was adjudged to the 
latter ; the hearing refused to his complaints at the 
Peshawnr Conference in 1876 ; and the occupation of 
Quetta. A few words will illustrnte the validity or 
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the reverse of ench of these ((grievances." The 
mission to Wakhan was nndoubteclly a breach of 
international etiquette, a Political Office blunder, and 
Shere Ali was justifiecl in his co~nplaint. The me- 
diatid'n in favour of Yaknb I<l~an was without the 
province of tlle Indian government, and, there- 
fore, as all unnecessary interference in the pri- 4 
vate affairs of foreign potentates must be considered, 
ill-advised. Lori1 Northbrook, by implicntion 
reproached tho Ameer for imprisoning the son to 
V ~ O I Y  he owed his throne, but the Russim general 
then on the Cabnl fi~ontier congratnlnted him upon 
having got nllder lock and key so dangerous a rebel. 
lC Yon are not a kind and gratef~ll father," said 
the one. You are a wise 1*uIeryJ' said the other. 
A11d Shere Ali, comparing the two together-for 
both letters arrived in Cr~bul within a few honrs of 
each otller-found the Rnssian congratulntion more 
to his tnste than the English admonition. On the 
next point, the Seistan arbitration, it can only be 
said that the mattcr before the Comuission was a I. 
vcry delicnte one, ancl that they decided as they 
thought right. That many were found at tho time, 
ancl many since, to quarrel with the amard, does 
not-strengthen Shere Ali in his attitude of cliscon- 
tent at the results of an ar1,it~ation to which he had 
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? 
volnntarily referred his claims. The next " griev- 
ance " of tlie Peshamnr Conference has been fairly 
a 10115, stntecl. by Sir Lewis Pelly himself. The negoti t '  
he tells ns, came at once to a dead-lock, because, on 
the British side, a preliminary discussion of the 
Ameer's complaints against us could not be agreed 
6 to, and, on the Afghan, becanse Shere Ali's repre- 
sentative would not listen to onr preliminary con- 
dition for f ~ ~ t m e  fri ndship - the presence of a Brj tish 
official at the Cabnl conrt. His last grievance on 
the list, the occul3ntion of Qnottn, cnnnot be enter- 
tained as a cause of complaint, Shere Ali himself 
agreed to that occupation ~vhen in prospect, and 
described himself as pleasecl. at it. Now thnt it is 
an acc~mpli~hecl. fact, and he finds it to be a strong 
bit in the mouth of Cabnl, the b e e r  protests. But  
the time for protest has passed. When the, two 
, 
countries were on friendly teims any opposition 
from him woulcl. have been received with deference ; 
but now that the immense strategic value of the 
li position has been made prominent by the rupture 
of those friendly relations, objection to our presence 
at Quetta must be futile. To understand our posi 
tion here, it is necessaryto refer briefly to the frontier 
of British India and the changes it has ~mdergone. 
The present Indian frontier on the north-west,, that 
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is to say, in its most comprehe~lsive extent, from 
Laclakh, on the borders of the Chinese eillpire, to 
the Arabian Sea, is for tlie most part defiilecl by 
mouritain ranges. There is the Karakoram range, 
north of Cashmere, the Snleiman, west of Pesal~mur 
and Bunnoo, and the Khirthar, west of Scinde. Tlle 
frontier of Gaslimere is satisfactory for defensive 
p~lrpose, for tlie Indus s~qq~lemcnts the great range 
of luountains. From Torliola to Dera Ghazi Khan 
our frontier may be clefiilecl as an irregular line 
clrawn at the base of {;he Suleiman and Safecl ICoh 
mountains, backed by the river lidus, at a clisiance 
vnrjing from ten miles to fifty. Along that frontier 
illere are mauy iml~oriant posts, Peshawur, ICohat, 
Bunnoo, Tank, Dcra Ismail IUlau, ancl Dern Gllazi 
Khan being the chief, and each of these posts is to 
all intents and purposes dependent ul~on its own 
resources, quite detached from our centres of polver, 
2nd have, moreover, in their rear the Inclus, which 
is often two, ancl sometimes three rivers. Even 
Dern G h ~ z i  Khan, the best off of these places, can 
only preserve comunnications with Milltan, its base, 
and a station on the Incl~ls Valley Railway, ~mcler 
difficult ancl uncertain conditions, for 730th the Indus 
and the Chenab intervene. The cliflicnlties of 
maintaining communications across the Indus . are 
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iillinense ; ancl it is only at Sukknr, where the Indns 
'Valley Railway crosses the river, that they have been 
successf~~lly coped with. 
In  history and in colnillon talk the Indns is called 
the western bomdary of our Indian empire. Bnt 
history lags, anil pcople tallring together prefer 
metaphor to exact fact. "Frolli the Indns t o  the 
Bay of Bengal " is a comprehensive, convenient, and 
sylnll~etrical pllrase ; but our fate in India-the fate 
that forbicls the conqneror to cease from conq~~est- 
has now carried ns beyoncl the great river. When 
we struck empire from tlie hand of the Lion of the 
Punjab, the great Sikh chieftain Ruiljeet Singh, our 
frontier outposts reddenecl the sl~urs of the Suleirnan 
range far beyond the Indus ; and when, tardily es- 
asperatecl, we clrove the Ameers of Sindh from their 
capitals, the border line was again carried vestwarcl 
throngh their principality to the marches of Beln- 
chistan. Yet once again we have had to step for- 
ward, westward, ancl this time into the very heart of 
the Beluchis co~lntry-to Qnetta. 
This advance was necessitated by the treachery of 
Shere Ali, which five years ago was snspected, and 
three years ago assured. The Peshaw~zr collferences 
was the last chance offered to Shere Ali to recover 
his lost ground; but ]lo rejected it. Sir Levis 
V 
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; armed force coulcl offer little molestation. These tribes muster in all some 7000 households, but they are scattered over so vide an area that when recently their snzerain, the Khan of I<hel~zt, organized a punitive expedition against tliem, no trouble mas fouad in reclucing them in detail to submission. In Deceivber snow falls, and often after that the road, 
though 'never impassable, is difficnlt. Tlie M ~ u g l ~ i  
Pass leads by an eensy ronte down to the Pcshin 
clistrict, and at I<uslilac, fonrteeil miles from Quettn, 
a small. stream of that name is passed, which de- 
lmxcates the frontier of Khelat ancl Cnbul. Anothcr 
eighteen miles of practicable road brings tllc tra- 
veller by the Snrmaghazi Pass to Hykalzai, situated 
on s plain of red clay soil-a, favonrite rendezvous 
of the nomad Tnrins, and marlced by nLmeroas ruins 
and several inhabited villages. Froin Hybalaai, a 
march of fifteen miles attains Aranbi Rariz, several 
sirearns being crossed. eiz 9-oz~te, and sl fair  prinkl ling 
of inhabitants enco~utered. 
Excellent roaclmay obtains thence past the spurs 
of the Toba rmgc, the populous  illa ages of thc 
Dihsuri Glen, to the Khojak Pass, at all times 
practicable in spite of its nsrromexs. On the 
southelm side the elevation has been recorded to be 
7000 feet, at the top of the pass 7410, and at 
Cl~aoliall, on the northern encl, 5600, and here, as 
everynrhere else along the road, pasture is al~nndant 
for three-fonrths of the year. From Chaolrah Lo 
Chaman, and thence to Gatni, sollie twenty-five 
miles, the route lies north-westerly along a gradual 
slope on to the unclulatiilg sweep of the plain ; ancl 
from Gatai n march of fourteen liiiles reaches Me1 
niIancla11, the road lying across a plain and rolling 
clowns, without inhabitants, as pasturage is very 
scanty, aiid the water brackish. After eighteen 
miles f~~r the r  Maku Icarez is made ; the Barghana 
Pass, which lies midway at an elevation of 4100 feet 
presenting no difficulty to the traveller. Thence n 
nrinding rwilie leads to the village of Maku, and six- 
teen llliles f ~ ~ ~ t l l c r ,  a oss an nnclnlating plain as far 
as the Arghesan river (a very shallow stream, though 
of considerable wividth), lies Munci I-Iissar, Froin here 
to I<anclahar is twelve miles. The whole route, it 
will be seen, is as easy as an invading army has any 
riglit to expect, and from end to end water and 
pasturage abound, mhile in the numerous flocks of 
sheep that are driven into the district to graze an 
abundant source of meat is at hand. The only 
. ,apprehension, therefore, is from the inhabitants 
- ~khemselves ; but from the mell-established popnlarity 
.af the British at Qnetta, and the general friendliness 
I 
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of the Belnchis towards us, there seems no grouild 
for snspecting interference with the advance. 
General Sir Henry Green writes,- 
I " There is no position on the mhole length of the 
I frontier of India better snited to maintain snch a 
I guarantee to clefend Afghanistan tllan is Qnetta. 
t I n  this position, comrnnnding the entrance to tho Bolan Pass, in a friendly country, snrronnded by 
friendly tribes, a British foorcc coulcl. assemble, 
I baclrccl. by the resources of England and of India, in 
I 
I a climate favo~uable to the Enropean constitution, 
aild from this ~osition it c0111d act either upon the 
offensive or defensive." 
The advance of S ~ Y  Jolin Iceane into Afghanistan 
in 1839 was effected by the Bolan Pass. It Tvns the 
refusal of Rnnjeet Sing11 t o  fulfil his promise of pre- 
i ~ a r i n g  the way for an easy advance of the British uiny throng11 bhc Sikh conntry to Cabul vhich finally 
t r  
led to the selection of Shilcarpnr, in Scinde, as the 
principal rendezvous of our forces, and the deter- 
mination to approach the Afghan capital by the more 
circuitous way of the Bolan, Qnetta, and Candahar 
-the Ameers of Sindh, more complaisant than the 
ruler of the Pnnjab, having promised to provide 
snpplies and means of conveyance. The difficulties 
enconntered by the Bengal colnrnn ullder Sir Wil- 
lougliby Cotton, consistil~g of 9500 n ~ e n  and tlie 
enormous number of 80,000 C ~ Z ~ X P  follon~ers, were 
rather of a physical than a military kind. The Bolnn 
Pass is sixty-six miles in length, wiuding, rugged, 
ancl flanlrecl by high rocks, its width gradually 
narrowing from three miles to abont 160 feet, ancl 
forage ancl water being entircly wanting. When the 
col~unn reached Daclur, at the foot of the monntains, 
on the 6th of March, provisiolls were already so 
short that the camp followers mere pui on half- 
raLions. Nevertheless, the troops reachecl. Quetta, 
after euclnring great privations. At Quetta the 
troops, failing to fincl the snpplies they expecied, 
mere compelled to pnsh forward in a famished con- 
dition to Ganclnhar, distant 150 miles, which place 
they reacliecl on the 26th of April, having marchecl. 
1000 miles since leaving. Ferozepi~r. The Bombay 
column, with Shah Shoojah's contingent, tvllich 
entered the pnss on the 12th of April, encoanterecl 
still greater fatignes and privations, and snffered, 
inorcovcr, fiolne harassnleni from the preclatory 
tribes which infest the ranges of liills in that clistrict. 
No serious opposition, ho~vever, vas enconnterecl 
from the Afgl~~ms, 
Candahar is an important t o m  in every sense, 
especially from a strategicnl point of view; for 
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I capital. The city is large and populous, containing, 
it is snpposecl, abont 150,000 inhabitants, chiefly 
I 
1 Afgliana. h genernl form it is oblong, and planllecl 
I vexy regularly, four main streets, cach fifty yards 
1 
wide, meeting in the centre, (where is a clolrted 
ma,rlret,) and leading to the fotur gates. 
I Entering by the " Cabul Gate," the traveller 
, traverses a long and tortuons line of narrow ancl 
filthy lanes, tvhich converge on the Sllahi Bazaar, 
I or Royal Market, and parade-gronncl, beyond 
P- and occ~~p;ying the northern quarter of the city, is 
I the Arg, or Citadel. Passing O L L ~  of the (' Herat 
Gate," the visitor finds hiinself in the summer 
gardens of the former rulers of C a ~ d a h a ~  and the 
ruins of the olcl city, which cover a gi-esi extent of 
surface along the base and slope of a high ridge of 
'9. 
t through it passes the best line of communication 
between Cab111 and Herat. I t  is also the capital of 
Southern Afgha~listan, nncl wlloever holds the city 
in force is master of the wl~ole of that part of 
! the c0~111try. Canclahnr is on the site of an ancient city, conjectured to have been founded by Alexander 
t the Great, and narnecl Alexandria, whence the old 
I nanlc Iskmclria, and tlie present Candal-~nr, founded 
by Ahrned Shah, in 1747. It was the seat of 
governinent till 1774, wheu Cabul became the 
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bare rock Ihat riscs on tlie plain about fo~onr iniles 
west of the present city. In  the suburbs are inally 
gardens ancl vineyards prodnaiilg various grapes of 
fine hinds am1 great variety of fruits ; the peaches, 
figs, innlberries, ancl pomegranates being of especial 
excellence. The military force in garrison at Can- 
clahar is always coasicleral~le. The city is well z 
vnkerecl by cannls from n tributary of the Halnlnnd 
river, nncl a s~lznll aqueduct runs along each of the 
main streets. 
Cn?ztlahctl. to Hel-(it.-The road for the first sixtecu 
miles from Candahar is bad, owing to the numerous 
unbridgecl streams nncl ~satercourses which it crosses. 
The next two clays' nlarches to Girislilr tlie road 
passes over a stony desert, in which water is scarcely 
to be procured. Girishlc is an illlportailt point on 
tlie road for tlie Halmancl, which in the boginning 
of May is 100 yards broad and thrcc-and-a-half feet 
deep, ancl can oilly be forded at that town. When , 
the river floods at the beginnkg of June, it is com- 
putecl to be aboat a mile broad. The left or soutl~eru 4. 
is higher than the right or northern b'nnk. The 
country in the neigl~boarhoocl is fertile, but the road 
then crosses a sterile plain, or rather plateau. The 
next clay's march water is to be obtained. At 
Dilaram, rnlater, forage, aild food are scarce. The 
roncl then passes throng11 a stoily valley, but levcl 
aid good, vith the dravback, however, ihat little 
vnter is Co be obtained. Fnrreli 011 the Furreh 
road or river, is but a heap'of ruins, vith little cul- 
tivation in the aeighbourhoocl. Tlle river is dry 
three-quarters of thc year ; Lnt at Che beginning of 
summer it is about 200 yards vide. Between Fnrreh 
and Subzevar tliere are no villages, the couiltry 
passecl through being a jriid.de of valleys and hills, 
with small plains inhabited by nomads. It is 
almost needless to say illat p~ovisions are scarce. 
On leaving Subzcizznr the road traverses a valley 
vell cultivated and coverecl by large flocks ancl 
herds. The road itself is good. Through the chain 
of ino~~iltains intervening between Subzewar nild 
Herat the road is very rough, ailcl between tlle 
111011th of the pass and Herat the cormtry is a perfect 
desert of hills and ruins, ancl water is scarcely to be 
obtained. 
Herat itself possesses natural aclvantages of 
clnitc exceptional importance. It is the frontier 
town between Persia mcl India, and is conncctecl by 
high ronds with the capitals of all the surrounding 
countries ; aitli  Cabnl through the Haznra hills ; 
with Balldl ancl Bokliara through Mailnena ; wit11 
Khiva tllrongll Merv ; with Meslled ; ~ 4 t h  Yezd and 
5s CABUL. 
Ispnhan; mith Seistan, ancl vith Canilal~a~. It 
elljoys an admirable climate, ancl is situated in the 
iniilst of one of the iliost fertile anil populous 
valleys in Asia. Above all the city itself is snr- 
ro~~i~clecl by earthworks of the most colossal clescrip- 
tion, clnting from prehistoric times, and which, mith 
the aclal~tations and ilvprovements of lnoclerll 
science, might be rendered quite impregnable to an 
Asiatic force. 
Ca~zc?nhci~. to Gllziz~~i.-As the reverse route is 
given in detail on pages 59-68, it is sufficient 
lo state here that the road is eminently practi- 
cable, ancl was traversocl by Sir John IZenne and 
General Nott, and others, with very little opposi- 
tioil. 
Sir John ICealic sct out on the 1st of July from 
Crmclahar, mllich had surrendered witllout a struggle, 
for Ghnzni, 230 miles distant. Ghuzni ~vas  taken 
by storm-the citadel being captured after a clespe- 
rate combat of three hours' dul.atioii. The force 
emploj~ed on our side in the operation amounted to 
4363 fighting men of all ranks. This was the final 
struggle of the campaign of 1839, for Dost 
Mahorned, on receipt of the news of tlie fall of 
Ghuzni, abanclonecl his throne, ancl flecl for ref~~ge 
beyond the 0x11s. 
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Thctl to Cnlzdlihal* vi4 Ghlizili altcl Ichilat-i-Ghilzai. 
-Thal (or Tlzull), which has ncquirecl importance 
ns a strategic point, is situated about lnidway be- 
t ~ e e u  the frontier outposts of Rohat and Banau. 
I t  commands the entrance to the ICt~r~zm Valley. 
The following p~ecis  of the march of the Mission of 
9 IS57 from Thal to Randal~ar enumerates the different 
stagos, and describes the country traver~ecl. 
Starting from Th~zl, they found thelnselves tra- 
versing a ravine-scored valley in vllich imninerablc 
sounders of wild pig fonild covert. Next day the 
river had to be forded, and the current mas 
then (in March) very rapid. For tment,y miles of 
clifficult and rocky road no hllhabitants or nniillal 
li;Fe, hardly any vegetation ~vas  encountered ; but, 
a~ l~ roach ing  Boghzai, the tiavellers fouild a hamlet 
of good size, in mlzich every male went fully armed. 
From Boghzni to Saclclah, thirteen miles, a sncces- 
sioil of corn-fields and orchards occupied the banks of 
the IC11ruin, loopholed huts peopiug out from among 
9 the fruit-trees. Thc next sixteen miles to Killa-i- 
Kururn (the fort of K ~ ~ m i n )  lay through similar 
scenes, many of the villngos having a coinpnct fort- 
like appearmce, and being amecl with chevcczlx cle 
fi-ise of thorns along their malls, The fort of I<llrurn is 
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described as of large extent, possessing eight bastions, 
each sumo~znted by a round tower, and the whole 
surrouncled vi th a moat crossed by drambridges with 
cc,verecl ways. Here the Mission was haltecl for four 
clays, not to enjoy the extraordinary natnral beau- 
ties of the spot, but to give time for certain mur- 
derous banditti, mdlo had occupied the road with the 
object of intercepting the travellers, to move off. As 
they ref~~sed  to do so, the Mission hncl to alter its 
so as to avoicl the obstruction. 
From the fort the travellers advanced through the 
valley, here from eighteen to twenty miles in wiclth, 
nncl crowded wit11 orchards ancl cornfields, inter- 
s ~ e r s e d  as usual mith embattled villages, md, as 
usual also, iuhnbitecl by lawless tribes. The next 
halt was a t  Hsbib E l l a  (sixteen miles), situated at tlle 
foot of the Sitn Ram pcak of the Sde? Koh. 
During the halt rumonrs got afloat that the Jaji 
tribe had innsterecl in  force on the other side of the 
hill and meant mischief. The Mission, however, 
apprehended no danger, ancl started, but were soon 
stoppecl by a band of fifty men, branclislGng wildly 
the formidable Afghan knives they carried, and 
cl~anting n war song. As if to lnak e a murdcrons 
attack upon the Mission, they leapt forward to with- 
in n few yards, but the escort dashed forward, iu- 
terposing thelliselves between the llplifted weapons, 
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ancl the Jajis quietly allon~ecl the cavalcade to file 
by unmolested. The next instant two black bears, 
startled from their lair by the noise, came out up011 
the path, nnd one of the party fired. The bcars 
ve1.e cloomccl in any case, for the escort soon cnt 
thein devil with their swords ; bnt the shot, mis- 
construed by the savage Jajis as a taunt, resultecl in 
a camp follower who had lagged behiilcl being hacliecl 
to pieces. Though the atrocious act was committed 
in  full sight of the baggage escort, pnnishment was 
impossible, for the Jajis leapt away, over and among 
tlie roclcs, with the speed of monkeys, and clisap- 
~earecl  from sight as suddenly as they had come. 
Anotl~er illustration of the exceptional savagery of 
the tribe is afforded by the nature of their hnts. 
These are square s t r~~ctnres  of stone allcl mud, 
erectecl on log platforms, and prof~~sely oophooled. 
The entrance is from beneath, by a trap-door and 
rope ladder, which is dravn LIP when the ininate is 
housed. When neighbouring families are o t feud, 
tliey keep snch a vigilant eye on each other's "shoot- 
ing boxes " that not unfrequenlly they are shut 
LIP mutually for meelrs together. 
Towards the Mission they contiilued obstinately 
hostile, ancl at Ali Khail a tragedy seenled immi- 
nent, for an army of 5000 Jnjis, under the leader- 
1 8  miles from Habib ICilla, 
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ra1~ (10 m.), along R district of extraordinary plenty 
and thickly popnlatecl-to Tmgi Wmclak (18 in.), 
dovn tlirongll the Tangi defile, to Hsidar Rhail (12 
ln.)--a village notorions, even in Afghanistan, for the 
audacity and skill of its robber folk. Next Smara 
(15 in ) ,  and then by the gorge of "the Lion's Month," 
and past the tomb of the Snltan Mallmud (22 m.), to 
Ghnzni. 
The fortress which mas blown L I ~  by Lord 
ICcane in 1842 had beell rebnilt, a fomidable- 
looking placc vith a citadel at the north angle in a 
co~nmanding sitnation, and containing solve fonr 
tl~onsancl honses. 
From Gl~nzni the route lay across a treeless ex- 
panse of plain to Yarghatti (18 m.), and tlience to 
Mukkar (42 m.). Over a grassy plain, along vliich 
caravans were ~villcling to Gholjen (12 m.), the site of 
the slaughter .of the Ghilzais by Nadir Shall, and 
thence to Moinin Icilla (14 m.) and Sir-i-Asp, where 
an escort from tlie Governor of Khilnt-i-Gllilzai (45 
m. from Molnin ICilln) met tlie Missioil aucl conducted 
it into the city. From Khilat-i-Gllileai to Jaddal~, 
tliirteen miles; Jaddak to Shalar-i-Safa, twenty- 
eight ; to Khail-i-Akhnn, fonrteen ; to &Iahmancl 
Iiilla, twelve ; to Candahar, ten miles. 
Peslzazoz~~. to Cabu1,-It may be considered toler- 
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ably certain that in sm actnnl illvasion zt column 
would enter Afghanistail by the ICllyber Pans. The 
road is quite practicable for all arms, and pro- 
visions are to be obtained aliliost everymhere along 
the ronte. Water also is abnnclant. The luonth 
of the pass is abont twenty miles froin PesBaw~~r ,~  
and miclwny stands the fort of Jnmroocl, erected by 
Rnnjeet Singh, and nov memorable as the scene of 
tlic repulse of the British Mission. Tliere arc two 
erltrallcas withill a, short distance of each other ; 
H.R,.H. the Prince of Wales, on the 22nd January, 18?G, 
k~iocked in the last riret of the railway bridge over the river 
Chenab, and now it is ill worlcing order well towards Attock on 
the Indus. Attock, on the Indus, is a large fort, cornmancling 
tha passage of the river, and would become a place of groat 
importance in case of nn invasion by the Khyber. The size of 
the present fort, and numerous towers, tells how important it 
has been considered by i ts  former possessors. Except in the 
raiuy  leaso on there is a bridge of boats at  this place, when the 
river rises, and a ferry only can take men or baggage across. 
Peshawur is then, in a military sense, cut off fro111 its base. 
T h o  rlifficulty will soon cease to exist, for n railway bridge will 
in a short time be completed, and the Indus will then be no 
longer n source of anxiety in the event of operations taking 
place on the frontier. It is about twenty miles from Attoclr to 
Peshawur, and the road follows aloug the right bank of the 
Cabul rirer. Peshawur itself is on a slightly rising ground with 
a plain extending on the north and east. 
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one, the main entrance, is called the Shader 
Bhnginree, thc other the J~tbogee. The former is 
the shorter, being oilly five nlilcs from the fort of 
Ali Mnsjicl. ; the lattcr, which joins the main pass 
near that fort, is twice as long. Froin the mouth 
of the pnss by thc maill road to its cnd at Dhnka is 
about twenty-six miles. Prom Dalrka to Jellnlabacl. 
is abont four marches, or about forty miles. Thc 
Khoorcl Cnbul Pass, where General Elphinstone's 
army was destroyed is only about ten miles 
from Cabul, ancl is the most formidable physical 
obstacle to a force marching from Jellalabacl on the 
capital. There is, hornever, another pass a short 
distance to the south, so the defenders' attention 
might easily be clistracted. 
A deep interest attaches to theadvance of Sir Claude 
Wade tl~rongh the Kliyber Pass in the teeth of the 
opposition of its defenders. Wade's force consistecl 
of considerable but irregular levies of Mnssulman 
Pnnjabees, partly led by British officers, conjoinecl 
to a small detachment of native infantry, and accom- 
panied by two howitzers of our native horse artil- 
lery. With this force, intended to act in concert 
with a corps of thc Silrh anny-an auxiliary which, 
of course, was not forthcomii~g until after news had 
been received of the British successes-6eneral 
3' 
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Wade zldvanced fi*om Peshawur. Attornpts had been 
made to obtain possession of the defiles of the Khyber 
by corrnpting the Mohmands on the left bank of the 
Cabnl river and the ICllyberi tribes in the monntain 
fastnesses, bnt those intrigues failed. Mahomed 
Akhbar, the eldest son of Dost Mahorned, made a 
resolute defence of the famous forb of Ali Musjid, 
~vllich stands at a point in the pass where the valley 
narrows and the road follows the course of a clear 
monntain stream. ' A traveller from the Afghan side, 
me are told, might pass by this fort without perceiv- 
ing it ; bnt wllen'he has followed the rivnlet a short 
distance down he mill,. if he faces abont, see its 
towers frownilig from a lofty and insulated eminence 
and complctely commanding the only approach. 
When the troops of the Ameer occnpied this strong- 
hold they were posted in the fort itself and on thc 
snmmits of the mountains which eaclose alld loolr 
down upon the valley. From these Colonel Wade's 
troops drove them, however, by asceading the 
heighte at distant poiats, and, advancing along the 
ridges, while the howitzers of our artillery, placed in 
battery in the hollow, clislodged the garrison with 
their shells. 
Thns, driven from All Mnsjid, Mahomed Akhbar yet 
contianed at the head of a considerable force to pre- 
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, sent a bold front to the invaders. As the disposition 
of his forces was skilful, it is probable that he mould 
have lnacle an energetic resistance; but his intentions 
mere frustratccl by the capture of Glinzni, which 
now rendered the defence of .the capital tlie most 
pressing object. Accordingly, the force under Wnile, 
finding its enemy dimiilished iu its front, penetrated 
Lhe last passes of the ICl~ybe~, and after .establishing 
a chain of posts along thc mountain ronte, slllcl on 
the right margin of the river, advanced witllont 
f~~r the r  obstacle to the neigl~bo~~rlioocd of Cab~bnl. I n  
brief, the passage of ihe drcaclecl Ichyber had proved 
to Wade's army an enterprise of little difficnlty ; 
but the circumstances mere obviously favourable. 
The attempt of General Pollock with his army 
of relief to force the Khyber Pass was t ed io~~s  
and difficult. At the fort of Ali Musjicl he expe- 
rienced a severe check, m d  it was not until the 
10th of April that he was heard of at Jellalabad as 
having reached the illidclle of the Pass. On the 
14th of that month the bcsiegecl garrison received 
the joyful news that the clifficulties of the passage 
were all surmounted, and that his losses in this 
scconcl atteinpt did not exceed one officer killecl, two 
or three wounded, a id  about 135 men killed and 
monndecl. General Polloclr's tactics were the same 
F 2 
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as those of Sir Clande Wade, his s~~ccessful progress 
being d ~ ~ e  io liis system of holding the heights with 
liis infantry before inoviilg his guns ancl baggage 
wit11 his cavdry. By neglecting this precaution, 
General Nott snffcrecl. somevliat from the shots of his' 
vatcld111 enemy. 
The disasters of 1842 have investecl the Kliyber 
with a romantic ancl. a gloomy interest ; and it 
is still customary to regucl. it as offering an in- 
surino~mtable obstacle to an invader if he disdain to 
p~~rcbase the goodwill of the " heacl men," who, 
as the representative of the lawless hill tribes, and 
recogliizing no allegiance to the ruler of Cabul, had 
recently agreed to pass Sir Neville Chamberlain 
ancl his escort throngh the dreaded gorges. Ex- 
perience, liowever, as above related, certainly does 
not bear out this view, tllough the Khyber, in tho 
possession of a British army with due provision 
for its defence, .~.vonlcl ~~ncluestionably prove a serious 
clifficulty in the way of an army advancing from 
i11e Afghan sidc. 
The aspect of affairs when the victorious Sir 
John Iceane ancl the coluilin under his command 
were retunling to India by this route, gave 
ominous token of f ~ ~ t u r e  tronbles. The intel- 
ligence that the predatory Ichyberis had attacked 
I 
1 an earthmorlr near the Ali Musjicl fort, and merci- 
lessly put to the sworcl 400 of its N~~jeeb  clefenclcrs, 
part of the British forces, mas significant ; and the 
occasional appearance of bands of these robbers, 
described as " men of clmarfisli stature, and remark- 
able for a peculiarly wild air ancl illean ancl squalid 
T clothing, creeping along cautiously out of point- blank range of rnuslretry on the ridge of the moun- 
I 
I . tains," rendered it advisable for the colnmi~ to move 
1 in closc and guarded srray, Once more, however, 
the terrible Khybcr tvas passed by a British army 
I without any serious irnpecliineiit. The disasters which subsequently befell the British 
forces in Cabnl, isolated and snrronnded by hostile 
tribes-the assassination of Sir Alexander Bnrnes 
1 and Sir William Macnaghten, the convention under 
which Major Pottinger and Galstailla Laurence mcl 1 Mnclrenzie were delivered up as hostages to Aklibar Khan, and the massacres which onsnred-are matters 
1 of history. Twenty-aix thonsand inen, ~~omei1, ancl 
6 children fell in the rocky defiles and inonlltain gorges 
1 of Afghanistan, partly nnder the incessant harass- 
I ment ancl mnrderous attacks of the Afghan troops 
and the wilcl hill tribes, but more from liz~nger and the 
deep silowe and wintry blasts of that id~ospitable 
region, five tlionsmd feet a b o ~ e  tlie level of tlie sea. 
Of all that host onlj one, Dr. Bryclon, made his 
may ali.ile to Jellslabad, bringing the news that the 
nrmy of Cabnl had ceased to exist. Seven or eight 
only of the survivors were taken prisoners ; the rest 
vere killed. Tho scene of those terrible disasters, 
however, was not the Rhyber Pass-which the 
retreating multitncle, in fact, never reached-but 
the Koorcl-Cabnl and sollie minor passes. Tho . 
attack incleed began almost as soon as the rctreat, 
though it was continned only in an irregular fashion; 
for, even famished and without hope, the British 
forces still foaght desperately, and kept their foe, 
as a rule, at a rcspectf~~l distance. Tlie ICoorcl- 
Cabnl pass is clescribed as five miles long, shut in 
on either hand by a line of lofty hills, with a torrent 
clashing c l o m  the centre which even the iutense 
frost was powerless to arrest. The clestrnction of 
life at this stage was great. On the next clay the 
retreat mas continned through a defile oniinonsly 
named the Dark Pass, only fifty yards long, sncl the 
Texeen Pnss, three i d e s  long. On the 11th  
General ,llphinstons, the cominancler-in-chief, fell 
into the hands of the enemy. On the following day 
they entered the terrible pass of Jngdullnk, two 
miles long, and very narrow and precipitous, and 
found the exit closed by strong bari.iers of prickly 
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holly-oak stretched across tlie defile. Here, with 
twenty muskets for tlieir only weapons, the miserable 
remnant of our forces made their final stand -- 
(' the rest was silence." 
BLI~ n gallant, well-led army soon effacecl. the 
and the year that had opeilecl. mith disaster 
closed with a very memorable tri~iruph, the forcing 
of t . 1 ~  ICl~yber and the desolation of the Ameer's 
capital. Tho history of that splendid vengeance 
has been often written, but it is well to-day to recall 
to lnind the true circnmstallces of that splendicl 
episode. Englishmell have been fo~md, at this 
crisis, who either from shameful ignorance of a 
glorious passage in our military annals or no less 
shameful perversion of notorious facts, have, in 
speeches to their constituencies, declared thet the 
lessoils of the past ongM to teach us cowardice in 
the present; and that because in Jannary, 1842, 
mmy Christian people, and more Hindoos-men, 
women, and children-fell victims to the pitiless 
treachery of the Afgllans and their allies, we are 
now to fear the ruler of Afghanistan. 
The defence aacl victory of Jellalabad, under 
General Sale, and the captnre of Ghuzni by General 
Nott, are other memories of this lloteble campaign. 
a See 11. 11. 
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Fro~ztier alzd i ' l l b z l~~ t~b i l~  Passes.-The Icohat Pass 
is aa independent strip, held by Africli tribes, of 
whom the chief are the Jowaki, the Galli, ancl Adam- 
Irheyl. The defile is about nine miles in length, 
and runs nearly dne north ancl south. In  the 
former direction it opens on to the plain or valley 
of Peshawur ; but towsll.ds the south it is shut off k 
from the adjoining district of Kohat by a high hill, 
which closes the pass in that direction, and must he 
s~rmounted in order to emerge from the defile on 
to the Kohat Valley. The southern slope of this 
hill is held by the British, who have threa round 
towers along its crest. Each of these shelters a 
party of the military police, whose clnty it is to keep 
open the road, and preserve its safety within British 
limits. The eastern side of the pass is formed 
by a tolerably regular iidge of hill that 
runs fiom no141 to south. But the opposite 
side, though formed of the same sort of bare nnin- 
terestkg looking rock, presents a very uneven out- 
line, being formed by off-shoots from the I(1iyber Y 
Hille, wl~icl~ run eastward or in a direction across 
the length of the pass, the general width of which 
they in eome places reduce to very narrow limits by 
their approximation to its opposite boundary. In  
the narrow little valleys or clefts between the hilly 
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ridges are the villages and fields of the Afridi tribes 
who hold this territory. Thesc people are entirely 
independent, and ackllomledge tlle authority neither 
of the Ameer of Cabul nor of the British. 
They are robbers by profession, ancl eternally 
at enmity among themselves or elsc vith their 
neighboars. Owing to their oft-recurring feuds 
slncl clnarrels, the pass, the passage through wliich 
in former times was always attended vith risk of 
life or property, is even now sometimee closed to the 
traveller. 
BnC since the establishment of British authority 
so close to them, its salutary influence seems in some 
ineasure to have curbed the lawlcss propensities of the 
Afridis, and the pass, as a rule, is pretty safe for trn- 
vellers, cxcept on those occasions wllcu the tribes 
are " up," and then it is entirely closed (for a longer 
or shorter period, till terins are come to with the 
British authorities on the frontier), ancl the direct 
commnnication bctween tlie military stations of 
Peshawar and Rohat becomes temporarily cut off. 
Through the lnonllCain ranges that at present 
form the north-west fsontier of India there exist Fu- 
numerable passes of various degrees of practicability. 
The smaller of these ilzonlltnin ranges, known as the 
Brahoe Mountains, lies just beyond tho borders of 
Scincle, and divides tlie Beluch district' of Rachhi 
from the metropolitan State of Khelat. Kuchhi was 
conquered from the Nawabs of Scincle by Abc111llah 
ICban, of IChelat, in 1730, and ever since that year 
has formed part of the State of Belnchistan. 
Tlirongh this range are several passes, notably the 
Bholan ancl Mula, but there are nine others which 
the natives illage nse of in passing from Rachhi to 
Saram~an and Jlialawan, ancl the crossing of vllich 
occulsics seven days. The Nagau and Bhore Passes 
lead to the city of Khelat direct, and are, if feasible 
for camel traffic, the most advantageously sitnatccl 
of all the Brahoe Passes. The M~da  and Bholan 
31-e formed by the action of the rivers, or rather tor- 
rents, of those names, and mark respectively the 
sonthe1.n ancl. northern limits of this mountain range. 
The Mula (Mnlob), or Gandava Pass, begins at a 
place called Pir Chdtta, nine miles dista~t  from the 
town of Xotri, which is ten miles ~0~1th-west of 
Gal~clavs. Between Pir Chatta ancl the next stage, 
K ~ ~ b a n ,  the Mula ~iver has to be crossed nine times. 
During the later stages of tlze joai-ney the same strcam 
has to be passed repeatedly, so tortuons is its conrse. 
The isass continnea in a southerly direction as far as 
Narr, which is a cultivated spot where supplies could 
be obtained. At Nnrr a crosa-road leads throngh 
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t 
Che village of Gaz, to the Belncll town of Khozclar, 
bnt the Mula Pass t~xils  north-west in the direction 
of Ichelat. The top of the pass is reached at tlle 
village of Angirn, vhere the altitude is 5250 feet, 
but it is only for a short distance Chat the height 
escceds 4000 feet. The great objection to the 
e Mnla Pass is its length-102 miles-and the fact 
that it only leads to Xhelat, 103 miles south of 
Quetta ; for othern~ise it is preferable, in a military 
sense, to the Bholnn. The average rise for the whole 
distance is forty-five feet in the mile. General 
VVillshire retnraed by this pass after the captt~se 
of I<helat, and Mr. Masson had also travellecl by it, . 
At the present mol-nent this pass is open, and con- 
tinues so thronghout the year; it is only in Jtdy 
ancl August dangerous from the floods that come 
dnring the met senson. 
The Bholan Pass, of mliich me practically hold 
possession by our garrison at Qnetta, and its 
sn~l)ort at Daclar, begins five miles to the north- 
+ west of tllc latter place. Its great advantage over 
the M~xla is that it is only sixty miles in length, ancl 
that it leads straight to Quetta on the Afghan 
frontier. I ts  crest is 5800 feet above the sea, and 
itss average ascent gives ninety feet to the mile. 
The great obstacle used to be froill tile Sir-i-Bholan 
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torrent, but that was only active during a few weeks 
in the wet season. In  the old clays this pass used 
to be invested by the Muriis and Icakarrs, I3el11ch 
tribes; but since our occupation of Qnetta there 
has been complete tranquility. In 1839 the army 
of Sir John Iceane took six days to traverse it, ancl 
this must be held to h a ~ e  been calital marching, Q 
I when we consider the vast multitude of camp fol- I lowers, ancl the clifficulties of transporting a siege- 
1 
train. A light col~~lnn could perform the distance 
I in three days. It is necessary to remember in com- 
i puting these distances that these passes take one 
far illto the Afghan territory, and not, like the 
northern passes, only into its outskirts. Quetta is 
very nearly in the same longitude as Khelat in the 
Ghilzai country, and considerably westward of Cabnl 
and Ghuzni. 
North of the Brahoe range, but 150 miles to  the 
east of it, comes the ~nleil?lan. That distance i3 
the ill-defined border between Icachhi and the Afghan 
provinces of Siwistan, and is held by the Murris, o 
Bugtees, and other tribes. The Lusharees ancl 
Lugarees are their neighbours, and acknowledge in 
some very vague sense their Afghan nationality. 
Through the Suleiizzan range proper there are 
numerous passes ; the Vacldor Pass from Dera Ghazi 
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Khm ; the Sari and Sounhm Passes from Lund; tho 
Bangar11 Pass from Taunsa; the Drug Pass fi'om 
Jholr Boclo; the Burkoie and Vahown Passes from 
Vahowa ; the Shnkau and Drabancl Passes from 
Dera Ismail Khan ; the Gumal or Gornul from Tak 
' or Tank ; and the Dawar from Bnnnoo. Of all of 
these pssses we know little or nothing; but their 
principal drawbsclr is that they are beyond the 
Inclns, and out of the may of our two true points of 
passage at Attoclr and Sukhnr. Om knomledge of 
the Gomnl Pass is principally derived from General 
Chamberlain's expedition against the Muhsoods in 
1860, when the force under his command operated 
against those marauders in the very heart of the hill 
conntry. The most striking past of this campaign 
was the gallantry with which an original plan was 
csr1-iecl ont. The little army, 5000 strong, left its 
base of Tmk, in the month of April, 1860, and 
pas$ing its way up the Zam stream, passed on boldly 
and steadily for the Muhsoocl stronghold. The force 
tvas accompanied not only by mountain guns on 
mules, but also by ordinary field-guns. Their 
village of Xot Shingee was occupied, and a sur- 
priso on our camp at Pnloseell was repulsed, after 
some hard fighting, with heavy loss to the assailants, 
who left 130 clead apon the fielcl. From Paloseen, 
1 
iJ 
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we marched on their capital of Xnneeghorum, 
which was occ~~piecl after a severe fight had taliell 
place along the banks of the Znm. The Muhsood 
conlltry surro~ucls the 1ofl;y pinnacle of Peerg.11111, i , 
aiid is very inaccessible to attaclr. Tlle lesson read 
them by the present Sir Neville Chamberlain wns 
a severe one, although it had cost us many lives 64 
and no small sum of money; aild ever since the 
Mnhsoocls have not given 11s much trouble on a large 
scnle, although petty ncts of marauclii~g continue. 
The Gomnl Pass leads straight to Gliuzni, and was 
, 
I the principal one used b;y Mahmond of Gliuzni in his 
numerous illvasions of Hindustan ; but in view of the 
hostility of the Muhsoods and other Waziris it may 
be'held to be at present useless to us. I t  has been 
suggested that the Draband Pass, froin Dera Ismail 
Khan through the Slievranee c o ~ ~ ~ l t r y ,  might prove, 
among the passes in this quarter, to be of import- 
ance to -LIS iu any carnl~o,ign, as there are thence 
ronds of some kind that lend clnemest into~f~l~ 'anistaiz ,  
and that vould strike tlle Cabul road probably at Q 
M~~lclznr, half-way betmeen Xhelat -i- Gllilzai and 
Gliuzni. 
North of thc Damnr Pass and Bumoo the Waziri 
country makes an illclellt~~re into the Indian fi-oil- 
tier similar to that farihev aofth by the Africli 
*. 
r 
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tongue of land between Kohat and Peshawar ; and 
tmenty-five miles to the north of Bnnnoo, with tlle 
TVaziri territory iiltel-veiling, lies the small place of 
Tlml, on the lsanlcs of the Knmm ri~rer. Its 
importance is that from it there is a pass by 
that  river to Cabul ailcl Ghuzni. Sir H. Lums- 
6 den's Mission entered Cabul by this road. So far 
as the fort of Mahoineil Azim,"fty miles, tlie road 
is direct and fairly passable. Proin t l is  place to 
Habib fort, ancl thcllce through the Paiwar Pnss, 
tlie English Mission in 1857 worked its way by a 
devious route to Haidarkhel, a village on the Cnbnl 
road, a little to the sontli of Shaikhabacl. Bnf; there 
is a shorter road to Calsul than this, which is nvail- 
able during thc snlnmer months at all events, ancl 
tliat is by the Shatnrgardan Pass, north-west of 
t h e  Paiwar, wlich debouches on the places named 
Lobnncli nnd Zurgonsha, in the iinmecliate vicinity of 
tlie capital. By this road the distance from Thal to 
Cabul is under 150 miles. In order to reach Ghnzai, 
a tlie road followed by the Lnmsclen Mission must be 
talcen, t ~ ~ r n i n g  off near the village of Knshi. 
The Khyber Pass, from its Peshawnr encl, near 
Jurnroocl, to its Jellalabad end, at Dakka, is twenty- 
Or Relln-i-ICt~rnm. Sce pp. 5.9-G3. 
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eight miles long. Exceptiag the Valley of Lalbeg- 
gurhee, six iniles long and one and a quarter broad, 
the rest of the Pass, twenty-two miles in length, is 
completely commanded, and there aTe few places 
where an advancing army could fincl cover. As, in 
the course of these twenty-two miles, the width of 
the pass ranges mostly from 100 to 200 yards, and 
nowhere exceeds 300, and as an Afghan jazail, fired 
from a rest, will kill at 800 yards, it follovs that 
any troops in the defile with hostile intent would be 
! exposed to a inurderous fire. The summit of the 
; pass is near the village of Lundeelrhana, nine miles 
from Dakka. Here the greatest height is reached- 
2488 feet above sea-level, or 1420 feet above Pesha- 
ww, and 1084 feet nbove Lalpoora, a village close 
to Dalrlra. The descent to Dakka is not very abrupt, 
but the road is contracted botween precipitous 
cliffs, covored with stqnted bushes, and the path is 
rough and stony for the best part of the dis- 
tance. Beyond Dakka again comes the Knm, or 
Khoorcl Khyber, otherwise " the Little Khyber," 
n gorge three-quarters of n mile long, where two 
horsemen can scarcely ride abreast. The most im- 
portant section of the pass, however, is near Ali 
Mnsjeed, and it was there that the piincil)al oppo- 
sition to Sir Claude Wade's advance was inade in 
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July, 1530, to the Sikh a~~xiliuries in Octobcr, and 
to soille British cletnchments in November of t.he 
same year. This section is about a mile ancl ,z half 
long, and is con~maucled by jaghirs (towers) alld 
sungahs (stone breastworks) at svcry point. For three 
miles, fi.om Ali M~~sjeecl towards Jumrood, the pass 
is from 150 to 200 yards wide, contracting in some 
parts to GO or 80. Ali Mnsjeecl itself is percllecl on 
a roclr 2,433 feet above the sea, or 940 feet below 
the surnlnit of the Passat L~~adeeMlana. The fort is 
about 150 feet long, and GO feet vide ; but the whole 
of the enclosed space is about 300 by 200 feet. 
There are three hills within from 200 to 300 
yarcls from the fort, each hill with a fortified post 
on it. In the centre of the pass, which is here 
150 yards wide, is a snngah. 
There are various slnall passes north ancl sonth 
of the Khyber, which strike that pass to the rear of 
Ali Musjicl, alld which, if ntilized, wonld isolate 
the garrison from all support. To make these 
available for our forces both the Mohmancls and 
the Africlis mnst be propitiated. Recent travels 
have thrown considerable light on the Bajour dis- 
trict north of the Cabnl River, and it vonld 
seein to be quite possible to secnrc Lalpua, by an 
dvance from onr fort of Abaeaie by the Inman Pass. 
G 
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Lalpnsa is nt the Afghan entilance to the IChybel*, 
and a stsongholcl. of tho Mohmands. It conlcl only 
be seized with their approbation, but it is ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ 0 2 3 0 s  
to re~lleivber that, in 1839, we intjtallecl. at this place 
a new r~der, Tornbnz Ichan, who remzlined faithf~~l 
to ns thong11 goocl and ill-fortune. The l~recedent 
might prove to be of l~ractical impoi*tance. 
Having described the chief passes tlmh lead 
through the Snleiman ancl Safed Koh, we may glance 
briefly at those farther west in Cab111 itself. Between 
Qnetta and Ranclahar there are two ranges of monn- 
tains, ancl the country to be traversed-is far fiorn 
being as easy as some would have us believe. The 
English army took eighteen days in marching the 
150 miles that intervene, although their advance was 
unresisted. The conntry is admirably adapted for 
purposes of defence, ancl at Haiclarzai, Hyknlzni, 
and the Khojak Pass a resolnte soldier could easily 
retard the advance of an invading army. The 
Khojak Pass though the Amran range is over 
7000 feet. 
Once we are at I<andahar, thewhole of the Afghani- 
stan south of the Hindi Kfish is at our mercy, for 
between that city and Cabul there are no passes 
worthy of the name, although the position on the 
Maiclan hills is very strong. In, the direction of 
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Herat there are several, bnt tliese need not be con- 
sicl.erecl. here, as Girishl~ ancl. the Halmancl. are the 
limits of the nleasures proposecl. t o  be taken by the 
I Indian Government, ~mless events become cl.evolopecl in Persia ancl. the Tnrkoinan country. Of the northe~x passes ilirongll the Hin& Ki~sh, the best known is that of Bamian or Sighan. The 
altitucle of this, on the clirect road to K h ~ ~ l r n  a d 
Balkh, is 8500 feet, ancl the I-Iarakotal Pass at 
1 tho northern entrance of the Sighan valley is the 
I same. From Bamian another road brallclles off clno west to  the Balkh river ancl. Shiborgan, ancl l;he 
heights of the two or three passes here vary from 
5000 t o  8000 feet. There is a fair roacl. in this 
I clirection from Banlian, wid Kilai Jahudi t o  Shibor- 
I gan, and Andchni to Rarklii, the Russo-Boldlaran 
post on the Oxus. Tile distance from ICarkhi to 
Bamian by this road is ollly 350 miles, ancl froin 
I Kl~oja Salih ancl Kilif the distance is rather less. 
East of Bamian there are the following passes 1 loading into tbe fertile valley of Pmnjkir :-The 1 IToushan, the Salalmg, the Girdshah, and the 
Ichawah. Their altitudes vary from 10,000 to 
12,000 feet. The Girdshd~, between Knadus, 
Inderanb, ancl Cabnl, is the most important and 
the most used. North-eastward of the Kllawals are 
G 2 
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the Ishkasin and N~~ksal l  Passes, 13,000 feet high, 
leading from Badakshan and ~ & k h a n  to the Chitral 
valley, and then, continuing along the Hincli~ Khsh, 
wc come to the Baroghil, 12,000 feet, leading from 
ICashgar. 
But nltllough these are the nninea of all the 
passes we know, it is evident, from the chronicle of 
.ow campaign of 1839-40 in these mountains that 
there aye many more-in fact, that between the 
valleys of nortllern Afghanistan-anc it is nothing 
bat a s~zccession of valleys-there is constant com- 
I munication by means of passes of all degrees of 
practicability. 
III thc western portion of the Hindfi IIGsh, viz. 
the Roh Sin11 and the Koh-i-Baba-thorc are passes 
at frequent intervals, made either by the Halrnand 
or the mountain torrents which rush clown to the 
Heri. In this little-known quarter of Afghanistan, 
held by Einak and Hazara mo~~ntaineers, and the 
whilom seat of the great Abdali clan, tlzere are 
scveral trade routes usecl. by the inhabitants. They LI 
dl point either to Herat, or southwarcl to Girishk I 1 
and Candahar, or nortl~ward to Maimena and Ballrh, 
Bokhara and Samnrcand, tho cities of wealth and 
lnxusy in the eyes of central Asiatics. Ancl in the 
low countiy bordering on tlle Turlcomaa clesort nncl. 
I 4 
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lying north of the mountains of Ghor thero is that 
main road from Herd to Maimena which crosses the 
M~~rgliab at the village of its name, and which is 
traced on througll dl those northern Kh~nates until 
it st~ikes that Little Pamir trade route which passes 
I through Walchan and Sirikol to Eastern Turkist an 
b and the westelm cities of China. 
At the present time the passes of the Suleirnan 
are of the more immediate importance, but in a 
political sense, and as m~t te r  of fact in a f ~ ~ t u r e  
day, those through the Hindb Khsh are of as great 
and lasting importance to us. 
The J f ~ z ~ n t a i n  Tribes.-The hill-men are, in the 
b e e r ' s  eyes, a weapon of offence against India, 
and ho has threatened to ('burl " them upon our 
territory. Unfort~nately, however, for his High- 
ness's project, the past year has seen a remarkable 
change in the attitnde of the rno~~ntaineers. Thc 
stern bloclcade of the Jom~kis in 1876-77 has effec- 
tually damped their ardonr for border distu~bance, 
a and since that event the fsontiers have enjoyed an 
1 exceptional tranq~1ility.l In the Hazara district 
I A despatch relnting to the Jovnki campaign was pnb- 
lisl~ed in the last Gazette. The Viceroy thanks the genornls 
and ~oldiers for their services. The secretary of the Punjub 
a 
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the minor colonies have all beell quiet, while the 
Inore important, hitherto so iiro.c.cblesorne, have 
a lolls been alillost ostentatious in their demonstr t' 
of docility. The CLiggnzai, Akazai, and Has- 
sanzai tribes have behavecl excellently, and the 
young chiefs of Agror are quietly at  school at  Abbo- 
tabad. In  the Pesham~r distipict tbe Hassan Kheyl L 
ancl Pass Africlis, of course, gave trouble, for what 
else could be expected from rnces who look upon the 
murcler of relatives as a point of etiquette ; but all 
the other Afridi tribes remained on friendly terms, 
j ns clid the inlportnnt section of the Mohmands. 
With Swat our relations have been undisturbed, ancl 
when the Uthman Rlleyls comniittod a gross outrnge 
upon some British subjects, the Akhoond of Swat, 
the most revered slsiritusl chief in the Northern 
Himalfiyas formnlly excommunicated thorn. I n  tho 
Rohnt district there was a serious rupture of the 
peace. The British government had long clesirecl 
to coiistrrrct a cart-road through tlle Icohzlt Pass, 
.L 
government drams attention t o  the  remnrlrable change effected 
in border warfare by breechloaders. The result of the cam- 
paigu provea concl~lsively tha t  the coercion. of any  hill tribea 
is now n matter of comparative ease. Certainly this is an 
importnl-lt considerahion' iu t h e  event of our being fo13ced into 
n war mith afghaniatan. 
f 
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nnd, though all the other tribes slg~eecl to  the pro- 
i: posal, one villnge obstii~ately ref~lsecl t o  permit the  
roncl. Lord Lytton accordingly 0~ganizec1 a syste- 
matic blockade of the disaffectecl tribe, and, a s  their 
I 
I example infected their neiglibonrs, the area of the  
i blockncle wns extended furthey and further, 11uti1 
c all the troublesome sections of the Jownki monn- 
taineers were inclnclecl. So rigorous and so un~rsual 
was the procedure that the tribes were soon fright- 
ened, and one af ts  the  other tliey c m e  in to tender 
their submission, to receive tlie punishment meted 
out to them, a~icl to  construct the roncl. This 
policy of blockade is n Britisli innovatioil in border 
tactics, and, jnclgecl by its results, a n  excellent 
one. Since the Jowakis were besieged there has 
been no disturbance on the frontier, nnd when, 
last woelr, the Mission was ref~lscd a passage by 
the officials of tlie Ameer, the  Rhybe~is, who 
actually formecl the escort of Major Csvagnari, 
behavecl excellently. The Ameer, therefore, may 
.; find the reed hc lenns on bl-t r i  weak staff; but, even 
, should l i s  intrigues succeed in spreading fresh clis- 
' 
nffection among the now tranquil monntai~lcers of the 
I Peshawur, ICohat, md Hazara  frontier^,^ we shall not 
I1 
I The following are the chief hill tribes on the nort;h-western 
IN frontier:-Hazara district-Cbiggnzais; Alrazais; Hnssanznis; 
i 
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find their combined terrors more overwhelming than 
in years past. Had me to force a way over the 
Suleiman range, vith every height cromded wit11 
shar~~shooters, tlie hill-men might, indeed, provo a 
formidable foe ; bnt by the possess'ion of Quetta we 
have a co~lmodious entrance to Cabnl securely at our 
command, and may use it to tnrn the flank of all the 4, 
mountnin tribes. In the open the Mohinancls, Africlis, 
Hassaa flleyls, and tlie rest are useless, for tlleir 
tactics are confined to night attacks, or to sudden 
rnshes from ambush npon stray travellers. They 
i lisvo never yet faced ten men togother, nor dared 
i to go beyond running distalice of their roclcs. 
Like their o m  hill leopards, they have jnst nudncity 
enougli to chop clown in the twilight npon a passer- 
by, but not the courage to face in tlie clayligllt 
an nrued man. But they monld be nseless wlien 
opposecl to the Ghoorlms, mllo, sent to the front in I 
Phurnri Syuds. Peshnzuz~r district-Hnssau Kheyls ; Afritliv 
of the Pnss nnd other tribes, as Sipah nnd Kuki Kheyl Ahicliu, @ 
See.; Bassi Kheyls ; Mohmnnds ; Utlunnn Kheyls. XoAat 
district-Adam Kheyl Afridie; Jowalriu ; Ornlrzais ; Waziris. 
Bnlznzr district-Mahsud and Darmesll IChcyls, Waziris. 
Dern I m u i l  X A a n  rlist7ict-lIasranis ; Ushteranns ; Sheranis ; 
3lnhsud \Vaziris, Bliitnni~. Dsra B l ~ n a ~ :  1Cl1nn District- 
Kaddianis ; Gurchanis ; M~lrris ; Bll~lgtis. 
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successive drafts, would soon clear out tlie fioniier 
ravines, aild one by one wonlcl render stel3 acco~ult 
of the eyries where the milcl inountaiueerv liad 
entrenchecl tl~emselves; for the Ghoorka, who can 
steal upon a sleeping panther vithout awnking it, 
ancl cnu out-tire the sturdy sainbh~~r in fair cl~ase, 
t. has no equal in the East foi* inountniu ~varfme. To 
this clo,y he wonders how the English bent him, hunt- 
ing him over his ova hills of Nepal, and clrivillg hiin 
from one end of the wild 13:nmnoni range to the 
otlier ; but, though mondering, he never hesitates to 
express his aclmiration of the British pluck that 
westecl his country from him, OF to demonstrate his 
loyalty by claiming to have a share in every fight. 
Let loose across the Indus, he would fly to the work 
like a cheetah slipped from his lash at grazing 
cleer, and np mil down the Cnbul hills would 
hunt the Africli soul out of the Ameer's men, 
Shore Ali, therefore, when he vaunts his pomer 
over the hill tribes, ancl his ability to "hurl " 
* them up011 British India " in blasts of fire," as 
his Highness exl~ressed it, makes an empty boast. 
the Iihyberis are to-day more peacefully disposed 
towards us than they have ever been since we 
pusl~ecl our frontier up to the foot of their hills. 
They are an inclepenclellt tribe, owning alleginnce to 
90 CIIBUL. 
, +. 
none, ~d willing t o  sell their services in the Best 
market. For many  yealms they have beev anxions to 
attain the dignity of tl~eaty relations with us, and 
Lord Lyttoa, wit11 t h e  same sagacious promptitncle 
thht has mmkecl his dbection of affairs, is prel~ared 
to accede to the i r  wishes. With the hill-men of the 
Pass in 01-m S O T V ~ C ~ S ~ ,  Cab111 becomes at once as 4% 
British as P e s h n w ~ u .  
I 
i I t  is to be n o t e d  in conliexion with the conduct of 
Shere Ali and the Afghan frontier question that a 
necessity h ~ s  ayisen for strengthening the Blitisli 
.naval s q ~ ~ a d r o ~ i  iu t h e  Persian Gulf. Between Persia 
and Afghanistan there exists indeed little love. The 
nttacks heretofore made  on Herat and the Seistan 
dispute have loft  bad  blood beliincl, and Teheran 
-wo111d never be likely to sympathize much with 
Cabul. But w i t h  Russia belrincl all these hostile 
intrigues, and far t o o  influential in Persia, we may 
need to be s t rong  in the Persian Gulf for other T 
causes than the piracies which are repo~Zled there ; 
and it is satisfactory on all accounts to know that 
a large addition to our force in these important 
waters will be at once made. This is the third 
time in history that Russian intrigues in the clirec- 
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.e b e s t  
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3, a n d  
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tion of Herat have been met by British demon- 
strations in the Persian Gulf. Let us hope it may 
be the last, ancl that England may for tlie ft~ture 
be so firmly settlecl in Afghanistan that Herat vill 
be for ever removecl beyoncl the illflneace of Russian 
francl, 
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